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CLOSING THE MASSACHUSETTS MUTUAL v.
RUSSELL GAP: MONETARY DAMAGE AWARDS
UNDER ERISA SECTION 502(a)(3)
Enacted in 1974, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)I comprehensively reformed employee benefit law by codifying standards
of conduct in respect to employee benefit plans. 2 Despite this reformation,
the issue of whether a plan3 beneficiary4 or participant 5 may receive
extracontractual 6 compensatory or punitive damages remains unsettled. At-

1. 29 U.S.C. § 1001-1461 (1988).
2. See S. BRUCE, PENSION CLius: Riars AND OBLIGATONS 5 (1988) (discussing ERISA's

comprehensive reform of employee benefit law).
3. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1,2) (1988), ERISA § 3(1,2) (defining plan). ERISA defines
one plan covered by the statute as an employee welfare benefit plan. Id. An employee welfare
benefit plan ig any plan, fund or program established or maintained to provide benefits
including medical, surgical or hospital care benefits; benefits in the event of sickness, death
or unemployment; vacation, training or apprenticeship benefits; and benefits including the
operation of day care centers, scholarship funds or prepaid legal services. Id.
A second plan covered by ERISA is an employee pension benefit plan. Id. An employee
pension benefit plan is any plan, fund or program which either provides retirement income to
employees, or results in a deferral of income to the termination of covered employment or
beyond. Id.
The determination of whether a plan is a plan covered by the provisions of ERISA is
beyond the scope of this note. See Kanne v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 859 F.2d 96,
98-99 (9th Cir. 1988) (determining that purchase of group insurance came within ERISA
definition of plan), vacated in part on other grounds 867 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, U.S.
, 109 S.Ct. 3216 (1989); Petr v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 712 F. Supp.
504, 507-508 (D.Md. 1989) (finding compensation plan within ERISA definition of plan); cf.
Otto v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 814 F.2d 1127, 1134-35 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding
annuity contract with insurer not within ERISA definition of plan), cert. denied, 486 U.S.
1026 (1988); Fraver v. North Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 801 F.2d 675, 676-78 (4th
Cir. 1986) (determining that contract provisions for termination benefits not within ERISA
definition of plan), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 919 (1987).
4. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(8) (1988), ERISA § 3(8) (defining beneficiary). The statute
defines a beneficiary as "a person designated by a participant, or by the terms of an employee
benefit plan, who is or may become entitled to a benefit thereunder." Id.
5. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) (1988), ERISA § 3(7) (defining participant). The statute
defines a participant as:
any employee or former employee of an employer, or any member or former member
of an employee organization, who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit of
any type from an employee benefit plan which covers employees of such employer
or members of such organization, or whose beneficiaries may be eligible to receive
any such benefit.
rd. For purposes of this note, the term beneficiary is used to connote both participant and
beneficiary. In the remedial context, the beneficiary and the participant receive the same
statutory protection. See 29 U.S.C. 1132(a) (1988), ERISA § 502(a) (defining ERISA's remedial
scheme).
6. See Drinkwater v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 846 F.2d 821, 824-25 (1st Cir.)
(defining extracontractual), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 909 (1988). The Drinkwater court defined
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tempting to resolve this question, the United States Supreme Court, in
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell' held that a plan
participant individually could not receive extracontractual or punitive damages under ERISA section 409,8 which covers liability for breach of fiduciary
duty.9 Russell's specific holding, however, did not address whether a participant could receive extracontractual or punitive damages under section
502,10 which is an entirely separate section of ERISA setting forth ERISA's
enforcement provisions." In view of the comprehensive enforcement provisions of ERISA12 and language in the statute allowing for equitable as
opposed to legal relief, 3 ERISA's drafters did not seem to contemplate
extracontractual damages and, therefore, damages properly termed extra
contractual should not be read into ERISA's enforcement provisions by the
courts.
The continual growth of the private pension system in the United States
has signaled a shift from a rural based society to a primarily urban based
society.' 4 This growth generated legislative concern over the pension system's

extracontractual as used in the Russell opinion as any damage award not within the terms of
the ERISA-governed benefit plan that is the subject of the litigation. Id.; see also infra notes
190-201 and accompanying text (discussing distinction between contractual and extracontractual
damages).
7. 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (1988), ERISA § 409; see also infra notes 38-43 and accompanying
text (discussing remedial provisions of ERISA § 409).
9. See infra note 72 and accompanying text (discussing holding of Russell).
10. See infra notes 31-47 and accompanying text (discussing enforcement provisions of
ERISA § 502).
11. See infra note 72 and accompanying text (discussing limited holding of Russell). The
holding of Russell also failed to reach the issue of whether a plan rather than an individual
could receive extracontractual damages under section 409 in an action brought by an individual
beneficiary. See infra notes 38-43 and accompanying text (discussing remedies available to plan
under ERISA § 409).
12. See infra notes 30-47 and accompanying text (discussing comprehensive enforcement
provisions of ERISA).
13. See infra notes 42-45 and accompanying text (discussing language in ERISA allowing
for equitable as opposed to legal relief).
14. See H.R. REP. No. 533, 93rd Cong., Ist Sess. 2-3 reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. AND ADmN. NEws at 4639, 4641 [hereinafter House Report] (discussing continual
growth of private pension system in United States and shift from rural to urban base). The
legislative history of the act states that in 1940 private pension plans only covered an estimated
four million employees. Id. at 3. By the 1970's, private pension plans covered over 30 million
employees. Id. This number represented at the time almost one-half of the private, non-farm
workforce. Id. The legislative history also predicted that by the early 1970's, the amount of
assets held in reserve to pay credited benefits had risen to $150 billion. Id.; see also BRucE,
supra note 2, at I (discussing current size and growth of pension plans since World War II).
As of 1988, thirty million American employees were participating in more than 500,000 private
pension plans. Id. The plans covering these employees were holding assets in excess of $948
billion and were receiving additional employer contributions of about $70 billion annually. Id.
As of 1988, private pension plans ranked second only to social security as a provider of
retirement income. Id.
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possible adverse impact on the American economy. 5 Congress' realization
that no single statute regulated the ever-growing pension system highlighted
this legislative concern.16 Rather, three federal statutes carried the burden
of regulating the pension system prior to 1974.17 These statutes were the
Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act," the Labor Management Relations Act,' 9 and the Internal Revenue Code. 2° The Welfare and Pension
Plan Disclosure Act, enacted in 1958, was primarily a reporting act which
sought to increase available information that would allow participants and
beneficiaries to oversee pension plans themselves. 2' Section 302 of the Labor
Management Relations Act, enacted in 1947, provided for the creation and
operation of a pension plan, but had no standards of conduct relating to
the plan once the plan became operative. 22 The Internal Revenue Code of
1954 also contained only limited provisions for pension security.23 Although
these three statutes evidenced some congressional concern over the creation

15. See House Report, supra note 14, at 3 reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CoNe.

AND

ADMrN. NEws at 4641. (discussing growth and impact of pension system on American economy).
16. See House Report, supra note 14 at 3-5 reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. AND

ADm.

NEws at 4641-43 (discussing existing law before enactment of ERISA). See generally
Aim PENSION SrUDY, S. REP. No. 634, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1971) (giving complete description of federal regulation affecting administration of
private plans).
17. See House Report, supra note 14, at 3 reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. AND
ADmN. NEws at 4641 (listing three statutes that covered pension plan security prior to 1974).
18. 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-309 (1968), repealed by Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974,
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
19. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-531 (1988).
20. I.R.C. §§ 401-404, 501-503 (1954).
21. See 29 U.S.C. §301 (1968) (asserting congressional purpose that statute require stricter
reporting), repealed by Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. 1001
(1988). In its short title, the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act stated that Congress
intended to protect the interests of participants and beneficiaries in employee benefit plans by
"requiring the disclosure and reporting to participants and beneficiaries of financial and other
information with respect thereto." Id.
22. See 29 U.S.C. § 302 (1968) (providing for creation and operation of employee pension
plans), repealed by Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1002
(1988); see also 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1988) (stating purposes of Labor Management Relations
Act). In its short title, the Labor Management Relations Act sets forth its general purposes.
Id. These purposes include the clarification of rights of both employer and employee, as well
as procedures for the orderly settlement of disputes. Id. The underlying purpose of the act is
to continue the full flow of commerce without the interference of employer-employee disputes.
Id. It is evident from this declaration of purpose that the rights of parties involved in employer
offered pension and welfare plans was intended to be secondary to the primary purpose of
the act, labor relations. Id.
23. See I.R.C. § 401 (1954) (discussing Internal Revenue Code's pension provisions). The
Internal Revenue Code, similar to the Labor Management Relation Act, did not have as its
primary focus the policing of employer pension and welfare plans. Id. Rather, the Internal
Revenue Code focused on the types of plans which would qualify as pensions for income
accounting procedures. Id. See also BRucE, supra note 2, at 5 (discussing the statutory
predecessors to ERISA). Bruce states that one primary impact of the Internal Revenue Code
on pensions was the provision, adopted in the 1942 Revenue Act, that pension plans could
not discriminate in favor of officers, shareholders or highly compensated employees. Id.
INTRmum REPoRT oF THE PiuvATE Wm.xaR
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and operation of pension plans, no comprehensive statute existed which
controlled all aspects of pension security. 24
Given the limited legal protection for pension security, Congress considered a bill, enacted as ERISA in 1974, to revise the Welfare and Pension
Plans Disclosure Act.21 The primary purpose of the proposed bill was to
protect individual pension rights that were in jeopardy because of inherent
defects in the existing statutory structure.M The drafters of ERISA designed

the statute, as enacted, to establish minimum standards of vesting27 and
funding,n and also to protect the security of pension rights. 29

By enacting ERISA's civil enforcement scheme, Congress intended to
provide income security while identifying specific causes of action which
could be brought under the statute.30 Section 502(a) contains six different

24. See House Report, supra note 14, at 4-5 reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CoNG. AND
ADMIN. NEws at 4642-43 (stating that no single statute existed governing pension security); S.
REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CoNG. AND AnimN. Naws
4838, 4841 (observing lack of comprehensive statute governing pension security).
25. H.R. 2, 92nd Cong., 2d
Sess. (1973).
/
26. See House Report, supra note 14, at I reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. AND
ADamN. NEWS at 4639 (stating that ERISA designed to revise Welfare and Pension Plans
Disclosure Act).
27. See M. C~ANA, QUALIFIED RimsuN AND OMR EMPLoYEE BENr PLANs 307
(1988) (discussing vesting requirements under ERISA). A benefit becomes vested under ERISA
at the moment that the benefit becomes non-forfeitable. Id. The amount of benefit that vests
in an employee is directly proportional to the years that the employee has been employed. Id.
at 308-309. For the minimum vesting standards under ERISA, see 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (1988),
ERISA § 203 (defining minimum vesting standards); see also BRUCE, supra note 2, at 184-245
(outlining vesting requirements of ERISA).
28. See BRUCE, supra note 2, at 21-22 (discussing funding of employee benefit plans).
An employer "funds" an employee benefit plan when the employer makes contributions to
the plan. Id. ERISA requires certain amounts to be contributed, or "funded," by employers
depending on the form of benefit plan offered by the employer. Id.; see also 29 U.S.C. §
1082 (1988), ERISA § 302 (defining ERISA's minimum funding standards).
29. See House Report, supra note 14, at 5 reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. A"
ADMN. NEWS at 4643 (stating that Congress intended ERISA to protect security of pension
rights); see also 29 U.S.C. §1001 (1988), ERISA § 2 (declaring congressional policy behind
ERISA). The Congressional declaration of policy states:
The Congress finds that the growth in size, scope and numbers of employee benefit
plans in recent years has been rapid and substantial; that the operational scope and
economic impact of such plans is increasingly interstate; that the continued wellbeing and security of millions of employees and their dependents are directly affected
by these plans;.. .that owing to the lack of employee information and adequate
safeguards concerning their operation, it is desirable in the interests of employees
and their beneficiaries, and to provide for the general welfare and free flow of
commerce, that disclosure be made and safeguards be provided with respect to the
establishment, operation, and administration of such plans;... and that it is therefore
desirable in the interests of employees and their beneficiaries, for the protection of
the revenue of the United States, and to provide for the free flow of commerce,
that minimum standards be provided assuring the equitable character of such plans
and their financial soundness.
Id.
30. See CANAN, supra note 27, at 658-684 (discussing enforcement provisions of ERISA).
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civil enforcement provisions,3" allowing actions to be brought by a participant, a beneficiary, a fiduciary or the Secretary of Labor. 2 Of these six
civil enforcement provisions, only four are available to a plan beneficiary.33
The effect of section 502(a)(1) 4 is to clarify the rights of the beneficiary,
31. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1988), ERISA § 502(a) (setting forth civil enforcement
provisions of ERISA). ERISA § 502 states:

CIviL

ENFORCEMENT

(A) PERSONS EMPOWERED TO BRING A CIVIL ACION

A civil action may be brought(1) by a participant or beneficiary(A) for the relief provided for in subsection (c) of this section, or
(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights
under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the
terms of the plan;
(2) by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary for appropriate
relief under section 409 of this title;
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which
violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain
other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any
provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan;
(4) by the Secretary, or by a participant, or beneficiary for appropriate relief in the
case of a violation of 1025(c) of this title;
(5) except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this section, by the Secretary
(A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter,
or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violation or (ii)
to enforce any provision of this subchapter; or
(6) by the Secretary to collect any civil penalty under subsection (i) of this section.
Id. See generally CANAN, supra note 27, at 658-684 (discussing civil enforcement provisions of
ERISA § 502).
32. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1988), ERISA § 502 (defining civil enforcement provisions of
ERISA); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1988), ERISA § 3(21)(A) (defining fiduciary). The
statute states that for purposes of the entire statute, a person is a fiduciary with respect to a
plan to the extent that that person exercises any discretionary control over the management
of the plan or the disposition of the plan's assets, or to the extent that the person renders
investment advice for a fee with respect to any monies in a plan, or to the extent that the
person has any discretionary authority over the plan. Id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1002(13) (1988),
ERISA § 302(13) (defining Secretary). The statute further states that for purposes of the entire
statute, references to the Secretary refer to the Secretary of Labor. Id.
33. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1988), ERISA § 502(a) (listing participant's four actions
against fiduciary for breach of trust).
34. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1) (1988), ERISA § 502(a)(1) (discussing first of six civil
enforcement remedies). Section 502(a)(1) of ERISA allows a participant to seek relief under §
502(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c) (1988), ERISA § 502(c) (providing
remedies to beneficiary where fiduciary fails to comply with request for information). Section
502(c) provides:
Any administrator who fails or refuses to comply with a request for any
information which such administrator is required by this subchapter to furnish to a
participant or beneficiary (unless such failure or refusal results from matters reasonably beyond the control of the administrator) by mailing the material requested to
the last known address of the requesting participant or beneficiary within 30 days
after such request may in the court's discretion be personally liable to such participant
or beneficiary for up to $100 a day from the date of such failure or refusal, and
the court may in its discretion order such other relief as it deems proper.
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pay benefits due, and secure present and future rights under an ERISA
governed plan.3" Similarly, under section 502(a)(4), a beneficiary may bring
a civil action for appropriate relief when the fiduciary has failed to properly
furnish the beneficiary with a statement of information furnished to the
Internal Revenue Service.3 6 Under all enforcement provisions of section
502(a), a beneficiary may recover attorney's fees at the discretion of the
court.

37

Section 502(a)(2) allows a beneficiary to seek appropriate relief under
section 40938 which defines liability for breach of fiduciary duties and
possible remedies.3 9 If a fiduciary breaches fiduciary duties to the plan, as
defined in section 404, 40 section 409 provides for several remedies.4 1 These

35. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1) (1988), ERISA § 502(a)(1) (describing civil action that
may be brought by ERISA participant). Section 502(a)(1) allows a plan participant to bring
an action similar to a contempt proceeding, authorizing a court to impose up to $100 per day
for non-compliance with a request for information. Id. Direct damages are also available to
a participant under this section, but these damages are only for amounts contractually due
under the terms of the plan. Id. Also under § 502(a)(1), a participant may bring an action
similar to a declaratory judgment against the plan administrator. Id.
36. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(4) (1988), ERISA § 502(a)(4) (discussing beneficiary's civil
action against fiduciary for failure to provide information given to Internal Revenue Service).
37. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) (1988), ERISA § 502(g)(1) (allowing for awards of
attorney's fees at discretion of court). 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) states: "In any action under this
subchapter... by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary, the court in its discretion may allow
a reasonable attorney's fee and costs of action to either party." Id. See generally Note,
Attorney's Fees Under ERISA: When Is An Award Appropriate?, 71 CoRNELL L. Ray. 1037
(1986) (discussing attorney's fee awards under ERISA).
38. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (1988), ERISA § 502(a)(2) (discussing second of six
enforcement provisions under ERISA); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (1988), ERISA § 409
(discussing liability for breach of fiduciary duty). 29 U.S.C. § 1109, ERISA § 409 states:
LiAnYrry FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY

(a) Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the
responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this subchapter
shall be personally liable to make good to. such plan any losses to the plan resulting
from each such breach and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary
which have been made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall
be subject to such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem
appropriate, including removal of such fiduciary.
Id.
39. 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (1988), ERISA § 409. An action for fiduciary breach must be
brought under § 502(a)(2) to enforce rights defined in section 409. Id.
40. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1988), ERISA § 404 (defining fiduciary duties under ERISA).
The statute states that a fiduciary must discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in
the interest of the participants and beneficiaries. Id. The statute further states that a fiduciary
must act for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries
while defraying reasonable expenses in administering the plan; a fiduciary must act with the
care, skill, prudence and diligence of a prudent man familiar with administering plans; a
fiduciary must diversify investments of a plan so as to minimize the risk of large losses; and
a fiduciary must act in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan.
Id. This note assumes that the fiduciary duty has been breached leading to the remedial
provisions of the statute. A discussion of judicial interpretation of breach of fiduciary duty is
beyond the scope of this note. For this discussion, see Knickerbocker, Trust Law with a

1991]

ERISA SECTION 502(a)(3)

remedies include personal liability of the fiduciary for any losses to the
plan as well as restoration to the plan of any profits earned by the fiduciary

with plan assets.4 2 In addition, the court may impose 4appropriate
equitable
3
or remedial relief, including removal of the fiduciary.

Under section 502(a)(3) a participant or beneficiary may bring a civil
action to enjoin any act or practice which violates ERISA or the terms of
the individual plan. 44 A participant or beneficiary may also bring an action
to obtain "other appropriate equitable relief"
to either redress violations
45
or enforce the statute or terms of the plan.
Given the civil enforcement provisions of ERISA, a participant's claim
for extracontractual relief must be made under either section 502(a)(2) or
502(a)(3).4 Because Congress did not provide for specific extracontractual
relief in section 502, courts are uncertain about the legislative intent behind
that section and have reached differing conclusions as to what damages
should be available.4 7 For example, in 1985, the United States Supreme
Court denied a claim for damages under section 502(a)(2)
of ERISA in
4

Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell.

In Russell the plaintiff qualified as a beneficiary under two employee
benefit plans administered by Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company. ERISA governed both plans.4 9 After suffering an injury which entitled
her to benefits, Russell stopped receiving those benefits after the plan

administrator determined that Russell no longer qualified. 0 After the plan
administrator reviewed a second report detailing Russell's injuries, -Russell

Difference: An Overview of ERISA Fiduciary Responsibility, 23 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J.
633 (1988); Scogland, FiduciaryDuty: What Does It Mean?, 24 TORT & INS. L.J. 803 (1989).
41. See 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (1988), ERISA § 409 (discussing liability for breach of fiduciary
duty).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1988), ERISA § 502(a)(3) (discussing third of six
enforcement provisions of ERISA).
45. Id. An action brought under ERISA § 502(a)(3) does not defer to any other section
of the statute, but rather is independent. See CANA, supra note 27, at 666-69 (stating that §
502(a)(3) operates independently of other remedial provisions of ERISA); Massachusetts Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 153-55 (1985) (concurring opinion of Brennan, J.)
(asserting that § 502(a)(3) operates independently of all other remedial provisions of ERISA).
46. See 29 U.S.C. §1132 (1988), ERISA § 502 (stating ERISA's enforcement provisions).
The language "other equitable or remedial relief" in 409, enforceable through § 502(a)(2),
and the language "other equitable relief" in § 502(a)(3) could allow a plan participant to sue
for damages beyond those specifically due under the terms of the plan. Id.
47. See BRUCE, supra note 2, at 672 (citing mixed decisions on the availability of
extracontractual damages).
48. 473 U.S. 134"(1985).
49. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 136 (1985). o
50. Id. In Russell, the plaintiff suffered a back injury that allowed her to receive plan
benefits. Id. Upon determining that she no longer qualified for benefits, the plan administrator
terminated her benefits under the plan. Id. The plaintiff then sought out and received a second
determination of her injury. Id.
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again began to receive benefits.-" The plan paid Russell's complete retroactive
benefits for the intervening period. 2 Although the plan paid Russell all
benefits contractually due, Russell sued for damages based on emotional
53
distress.
The United States District Court for the Central District of California
granted a summary judgment motion for Massachusetts Mutual.1 4 The
district court held that ERISA barred any claim to extracontractua 55 or
punitive damages for the original denial of benefits under plaintiff's plans.5 6
Reversing the lower court's holding, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit held that Massachusetts Mutual's violation did give
rise to a cause of action under section 409(a) which a plan beneficiary could
assert pursuant to section 502(a)(2). 57 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the
language of section 409 that asserted "such other equitable or remedial
relief as the court may deem appropriate" allowed for a damage award
which would remedy the wrong and make the aggrieved individual whole."
The Ninth Circuit also held that a participant or beneficiary could recover
punitive damages under section 409(a) but concluded that these damages
only would be recoverable if the fiduciary acted with actual malice or
wanton indifference to the rights of the participant or beneficiary. 9
Reversing the Ninth Circuit's decision, the United States Supreme Court
held that, while a beneficiary may bring a cause of action under section
502(a)(2), recovery under this section must benefit the plan as a whole, not
an individual beneficiary. 60 Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens reasoned that by reading the text of section 409 as a whole, the remedies are

51. Id. In Russell, five months lapsed between the initial denial of benefits to the plaintiff
and the reinstatement of new benefits. Id.
52. Id. The Russell court also pointed out that the plaintiff later qualified for permanent
disability benefits which, up to the time of the suit, Massachusetts Mutual had paid regularly.
Id.
53. Id. at 137. In Russell, the plaintiff claimed that the fiduciaries administering the
plan breached their fiduciary duties by ignoring readily available medical evidence, by applying
unwarrantedly strict eligibility standards, and by deliberately delaying processing of her claim
beyond the 120 days required by Secretary of Labor regulations (29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(h)
(1984)). Id. For a closer analysis of the plaintiff's claims and the proceedings in the lower
courts, see generally Note, Participantand Beneficiary Remedies Under ERISA: Extracontractual and Punitive Damages after Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell, 71
CORNELL L. Ray. 1014 (1986).
54. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 137 (1985).
55. Id. at 136. The Russell Court used the term extracontractual, but did not indicate
in the opinion any specific definition of that term. Id.; see also supra note 6 (defining
extracontractual).
56. Russell, 473 U.S. at 137.
57. Russell v. MassachusettsMut. Life Ins. Co., 722 F.2d 482, 490 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd
473 U.S. 134 (1985).
58. Id. at 490.
59. Id. at 490-492.
60. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell 473 U.S. 134, 140 (1985).
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"plan related." 61 The majority asserted that concern of ERISA's drafters
focused on remedies that would protect the entire plan rather than the rights
of an individual beneficiary. 62 Finding nothing in the statutory text which
supported a private right of action for compensatory or punitive relief, 63
the majority further held that the legislative history of ERISA implies that
extracontractual compensatory and punitive damages fall outside of the
statute's provisions." Justice Stevens cited to the legislative history which
originally used the terminology "legal or equitable" relief. 65 In the final
bill, Justice Stevens observed, the drafters deleted the reference to "legal"
relief, evidencing an appreciation of the distinction between the two forms
of relief. 66 The majority reasoned that the six carefully integrated civil
enforcement provisions found in section 502(a)67 provided strong evidence
that Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies not expressly
included in the statute. 68 The majority found adequate remedial relief in

61. Id.at 142. In Russell, Justice Stevens looked to the sections of ERISA defining a
fiduciary's relationships under the statute for the proposition that remedies are plan related.
Id.In all instances, Stevens found that a fiduciary's primary relationship is always to the
plan. Id. at 140-42.
62. Id.at 142.
63. Id., at 144.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 146. In Russell, Justice Stevens cited to House and Senate Reports, which
both included references to legal relief. Id. See House Report, supra note 14, at 17, reprinted
in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. AND ADuaN. NEws at 4655 (asserting that ERISA's remedy structure
provided legal and equitable relief); S. RE'. No. 93-127 35, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. AND ADMxn. Naws at 4871 (same).
66. Russell, 473 U.S. at 146. The Russell Court emphasized the fact that the references
in the legislative history to legal relief stem from reports published before debate on the Senate
and House floors. Id. The Court, therefore, placed little weight on the references to "legal"
relief relied on by the plaintiff. Id.; see also DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REmEDms 3
(1973) (discussing distinction between legal and equitable remedies) Remedies may be classified
as either legal or equitable. Id. Legal remedies traditionally include damages, while equitable
remedies, such as injunctions, are coercive. Id. Dobbs states that merger of law and equity
into one court renders some of the distinctions between the two principles moot. Id. The
specific mention of equitable remedies in ERISA to the exclusion of legal remedies, however,
convinced the Russell court that legal remedies are beyond the scope of the statute. See Russell,
473 U.S. at 135 (highlighting Russell majority's refusal to include remedy Congress did not
incorporate expressly); see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 1109, 1132(a)(2), 1132(a)(3) (mentioning equitable
relief to exclusion of legal relief).
67. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1988), ERISA § 502(a) (listing six civil enforcement remedies
of ERISA).
68. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146 (1985). For the
proposition that ERISA is a comprehensively drafted statute, Justice Stevens, in Russell, cited
Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980). The implication
Stevens makes in Russell is that the exclusive ERISA remedies should preempt all others.
Russell, 473 U.S. at 146-147. Justice Stevens stated "[tihe six carefully integrated civil
enforcement provisions found in § 502 of the statute as finally enacted ... provide strong
evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to
incorporate expressly." (emphasis in original) Id. at 146; see also Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987) (citing Russell for proposition that ERISA's remedies are

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:691

the express provisions of the statute69 and further stated that the courts

should be reluctant to fine tune ERISA's enforcement provisions which,
Justice Stevens asserted, had been drafted with care. 70 Citing to a stark
absence in both the statute itself and in the legislative history of any

intention to authorize extracontractual damages, the majority found this
lack of acknowledgement of an extracontractual remedy in direct contrast
to the repeatedly emphasized purpose of protecting contractually defined

benefits. 7' Despite holding that an individual's cause of action must fail
under section 502(a)(2), the Court failed to answer whether an individual
participant may recover extracontractual compensatory or punitive damages

under section 502(a)(3), an independent remedial provision of the statute. 72
Although the Russell decision was unanimous, a strong concurring

opinion, written by Justic& Brennan, challenged much of the majority's
holding as dicta. 73 Justice Brennan attempted to limit the majority's holding
to whether section 409's "appropriate relief" referred to in section 502(a)(2)
includes individual recovery by a participant or beneficiary of extracontractual damages for breach of fiduciary duty. 74 While agreeing with the majority
that section 409 only provides remedies to an entire plan as opposed to
individuals, Justice Brennan reasoned that participants and beneficiaries
should be able to look to other parts of the statute for relief. 75 For this
additional relief, Brennan concluded that a participant or beneficiary should
be able to look to section 502(a)(3). 76 Justice Brennan disagreed with the

exclusive). The United States Supreme Court in Pilot Life, after citing Justice Stevens' opinion
in Russell, stated: "The deliberate care with which ERISA's civil enforcement remedies were
drafted and the balancing of policies embodied in its choice of remedies argue strongly for
the conclusion that ERISA's civil enforcement remedies were intended to be exclusive." Pilot
Life, 481 U.S. at 54; see also Ingersoll Rand Co. v. McClendon, 111 S.Ct. 478, 485 (1990)
(citing Pilot Life and Russell for proposition that Congress intended § 502(a) to govern all
remedies under ERISA); Narda, Inc. v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank, 744 F.
Supp. 685, 696-97 (D.Md. 1990) (contending that ERISA's inclusion of certain remedies should
exclude all others).
69. Russell, 473 U.S. at 147. In Russell, Justice Stevens asserted that provisions in
ERISA allowing for removal of fiduciaries [§ 409] and for awards of attorney's fees [§ 502(g)]
provided ample redress for a plan beneficiary without awarding extracontractual damages. Id.
Justice Stevens specifically noted that concern that claims would not be brought was unfounded
in light of ERISA's provision for awards of reasonable attorney's fees. Id.; see also supra
note 37 and accompanying text (discussing ERISA's provision for awards of attorney's fees).
70. Russell, 473 U.S. at 147.
71. Id. at 148.
72. Id. at 148. The Russell Court's specific holding stated:
Thus, the relevant text of ERISA, the structure of the entire statute, and its legislative
history all support the conclusion that in § 409(a) Congress did not provide, and
did not intend the judiciary to imply, a cause of action for extracontractual damages
caused by improper or untimely processing of benefit claims.
Id.
73. Id. at 148 (Brennan, J., concurring).
74. Id. at 149.
75. Id. at 150.
76. Id.
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majority's limitation on the availability of extra-contractual damages to a
plan participant or beneficiary under all provisions of ERISA.7 7 Justice
Brennan believed the legislative history of ERISA gave federal courts

significant freedom to develop a federal common law around the statute.7789
Brennan reasoned that this common law should arise from trust law.
Interpreting trust law in the case of breach of fiduciary duty, Brennan
stated that a "black letter" concept of trust law is that courts will award

remedies to beneficiaries necessary to protect the interests of the beneficiary.80 Thus, Justice Brennan concluded that a beneficiary is entitled to a

77. Id. at 151.
78. Id. at 156; see also Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987) (asserting
that Congress intended federal law to solely govern ERISA). The Court in Pilot Life stated
ERISA included an expectation that federal lay would exclusively govern ERISA regulated
plans. Id. The court further stated that the remedies already explicitly included in ERISA
indicated that courts should not create new federal common law remedies. Id. But see H.Rep.
No. 247, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 55-56 reprinted in 1989 U.S. CODE CONG. AND ADm[N. NEws
at 1947-48 (stating that federal courts should fashion federal common law with respect to
employee benefit plans). The Committee on Education and Labor, in response to the Supreme
Court's decision in Pilot Life that ERISA's enforcement provisions were exclusive, stressed
that the Committee still believed courts should develop a federal common law around ERISA.
H.R. REP. No. 247, at 56 reprinted in 1989 U.S. CODE CONG. AND ADMN. NEws at 48. The
Committee then reaffirmed the authority of courts to shape legal and equitable remedies to
fit the facts of cases before them. Id. The Eleventh Circuit rejected the directive of the House
Report in the face of judicial precedent to the contrary. See infra notes 135-138 and
accompanying text (discussing Eleventh Circuit's assertion that H.R. REP. 247 carries little
weight in light of judicial precedent).
79. MassachusettsMut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 154-158 (1985) (Brennan,
J. concurring). In Russell, Justice Brennan found authority in the legislative history for the
proposition that courts should develop a common law around ERISA based on trust law. Id.;
see also House Report, supra note 14, at 13 reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. AND ADxN.
Naws at 4651 (indicating Congressional intent to incorporate trust law into ERISA). The
legislative history states "[tihe principles of fiduciary conduct are adopted from existing trust
law, but with modifications appropriate for employee benefit plans." Id. Brennan also cited
to case law. Russell, 473 U.S. at 153; see also Central States Southeast & Southwest Areas
Pension Fund v. Central Transport, Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 570 (1985) (stating that Congress
invoked common law of trusts to define fiduciary authority and responsibility); NLRB v.
Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 332 (1981) (stating that Congress codified trust principles into
ERISA); Leigh v. Engie, 727 F.2d 113, 122 (7th Cir. 1984) (asserting that ERISA requires
fiduciaries to act solely in interest of beneficiaries); Donovan v. Mazzola, 716 F.2d 1226, 1231
(9th Cir. 1983) (applying principles developed under common law of trusts to ERISA); Sinai
Hosp. v. National Benefit Fund for Hosp. & Health Care Employers, 697 F.2d 562, 565-66
(4th Cir. 1982) (citing Amax for the proposition that ERISA incorporates trust law); Donovan
v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 271 (2nd Cir.) (citing trust law to determine duties of ERISA plan
fiduciary), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1069 (1982). For more recent cases holding that ERISA
incorporates trust law, see Nieto v. Ecker 845 F.2d 868, 872 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Mazzola
for proposition that ERISA incorporates trust law); Martens v. Kaiser Steel Retirement Plan,
744 F.Supp. 917, 920 (N.D.Cal. 1990) (citing Nieto for proposition that Congress intended
courts to draw. on trust law when formulating remedies under ERISA).
80. Russell, 473 U.S. at 157 (Brennan, J., concurring). For the proposition that trust
law allows for remedies to protect beneficiary interests, Justice Brennan, in Russell cited several
sources. See 3 ScoTT & FRATCHER, Tam LAw OF TRusTs § 199 (4th ed. 1988) (stating that
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remedy which would put the beneficiary in the position in which the
beneficiary would have been if there had been no breach of trust.8
Both the legislative history of ERISA and the concurring opinion in
Russell mention that ERISA's drafters intended courts to administer ERISA
as an equitable statute, using the law of trusts as a framework.8 2 With very
limited exceptions, the remedies of a beneficiary under trust law are equitable. 3 In an equitable action by a beneficiary against a trustee for breach
of trust, five remedies are available to the court 4 Of these five remedies,
only one remedy provides for an award of monetary damages.' 5 Trust law
provides that a beneficiary may maintain a suit to compel the trustee to
redress a breach of trust.86 This redressability, however, is limited. A trustee

beneficiary is entitled to remedy that will put beneficiary in same position prior to breach of
trust); RESTATEumNT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 205, and comment a (1959) (same); G.G. BOGERT
& G.T. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 862 (rev. 2d ed. 1982) (same). See infra notes 83-96
and accompanying text (discussing remedial provisions of trust law).
81. Russell, 473 U.S. at 157, n. 16 (Brennan, J., concurring).
82. See Id. at 152 (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that Congress intended to incorporate
trust law into ERISA); House Report, supra note 14, at 13 reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. AND ADMIN. NEWs at 4649 (stating that drafters designed fiduciary responsibility section
of ERISA using law of trusts); S. REP. 93-127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. at 28 reprinted in 1974
U.S. CODE CONG. AND ADMN. NEWS at 4865 (indicating Congressional intent to incorporate
trust law into ERISA); see also Transamerica Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. DiGregorio,
811 F.2d 1249, 1252 (9th Cir. 1987) (asserting that ERISA only permits equitable actions).
83. See G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, TRUSTS A" TRUSTEES § 861 (rev. 2d ed. 1982)
(stating that equity is primarily responsible for the protection or rights arising under trusts);
3 ScoTT & FEATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 197 at 188-89 (4th Ed. 1988) (stating that trusts
are within the province of equity); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 197 (1959) (stating
that with single limited exception, remedies of beneficiary against trustee are exclusively
equitable); see also Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003, 1007 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding
common law of trusts equitable in character); In re Vorpahl, 695 F.2d 318, 321 (8th Cir.
1982) (asserting that trust law is equitable); Wardle v. Central States Southeast & Southwest
Areas Pension Fund, 627 F.2d 820, 829 (7th Cir. 1980) (stating that suits for pension benefits
are equitable in nature), cert. denied 449 U.S. 1112 (1981).
84. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 199 (1959) (setting forth equitable remedies
of beneficiary). First, a suit may be maintained to compel the trustee to perform his duties as
trustee. Id. Second, a suit may be maintained to enjoin the trustee from committing a breach
of trust. Id. Third, the beneficiary can sue to compel the trustee to redress a breach of trust.
Id. Fourth, the beneficiary may sue to appoint a receiver to take possession of the trust
property and administer the trust. Id. Finally, a beneficiary may maintain a suit to remove
the trustee. Id. See generally 3 ScoTT & FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 199 at 203-207 (4th
ed. 1988) (detailing equitable remedies).
85. See RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 199(c) and comment c (1959) (providing for
action by beneficiary against fiduciary to compel fiduciary to redress breach of trust); 3 SCOTT
& FRATCHER, Tan LAW OF TRUSTS § 199.3 at 206 (4th ed. 1988) (stating that redressability
provision of trust law provides for monetary damage awards).
86. See REsTATEumNT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 199(c) and comment c (1959) (providing for
action by beneficiary against fiduciary to compel fiduciary to redress breach of trust); 3 ScoTT
& FRATCHER, Tam LAw OF TRUSTS § 199.3 at 206 (4th ed. 1988) (stating that if trustee has
committed breach of trust, beneficiary may maintain action to compel redress of breach). See
generally G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 861 (rev. 2d ed. 1982)
(discussing remedies available to beneficiary).
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who commits a breach of trust is only liable for: 1) any loss or depreciation
in value of the trust estate, 2) any profit made by the trustee, and 3) any
profit which would have accrued to the trust estate had there been no
breach of trust.s7 Under the provision allowing for a return of profits that
the trust would have earned, the purpose of returning profit is to put the
beneficiary in as good a position as he would have been in had there been
no breach. s8 If the concept of liability for unrealized profit is read broadly,
indirect monetary damage awards might be read into trust law as consequential to a breach of trust.8 9 The law of trusts, however" emphasizes
equitable remedies, including injunctions and declaratory relief. 9° When
monetary damage awards are made, these awards are generally given'to
effectuate the contractual terms of the trust. 91 The use of the terms "con-

87. See RESTATEmENT (SEcoNm) OF TRUSTS § 205 (1959) (indicating liability of trustee
where trustee has breached trust); 3 ScoTT & FRATCHER, THE LAW Op TRusTs § 205 at 237
(4th ed. 1988) *(stating that beneficiary has three alternative monetary remedies where fiduciary
breached trust). See generally G.G. BoGERT & G.T. BoGERT, TRusTs AND TRUsTS § 862 (rev.
2d ed. 1982) (discussing possible monetary awards where trustee breached trust).
88. See RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TRusrs § 205 Comment a (1959) (discussing alternative
remedies for breach of trust). The comment states that a beneficiary may under § 205 seek a
remedy which will put him in the position in which he would have been if the trustee had not
committed the breach of trust. Id. See 3 ScoTT & FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 205 at
240 (4th ed. 1988) (asserting that beneficiaries are entitled to be put in position they would
have been in had there been no breach of trust).
89. See infra notes 148-149 and accompanying text (discussing Sixth Circuit's assertion
that trust law interpretation of ERISA's enforcement provisions does not preclude monetary
damage awards).
90. See REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TRusTs § 199 (1959) (discussing equitable remedies
available under the law of trusts); 3 ScoTT & FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 199 at 203207 (4th ed. 1988) (illustrating trust law's provision for declaratory and injunctive relief). See
generally G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BoaRT, TRUSTS AND TRusTmS § 861 (rev. 2d Ed. 1982)
(detailing equitable remedies under trust law).
91. See RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) oF TRUSTS § 205 (1959) (discussing liability of trustee in
case of breach of trust). Even where the comments to § 205 state that lost profits may be
recovered, this recovery is limited. The example in the RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS is
recovery of interest. See id. comment i (giving lost interest as example of lost profits);
REATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TRUsTS § 207 (1959) (discussing liability of trustee for interest where
the trustee has committed breach of trust). Section 207 of the Restatement allows the recovery
of interest at the legal rate or whatever rate the court may determine. Id. This interest must
be interest actually received by the trustee or interest the trustee should have received. Id. The
Restatement is careful even in the case of interest to limit the recovery to interest directly
traceable to the breach of trust. See id. (discussing proper computation of interest); see also
3 ScoTT & FRATCHER, Tm LAw oF TRusTS § 207 at 255-66 (4th ed. 1988) (discussing trustee
liability for interest where breach of trust).
In the ERISA context, interest awards provide an illustrative example of the distinction
courts make between contractual and extracontractual awards. Id. Consistently, courts have
not balked at awarding prejudgment interest in ERISA cases for lost benefits. See Katsaros v.
Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 281 (2d Cir. 1984) (awarding prejudgment interest in ERISA case), cert
denied sub nom. Cody v. Donovan, 469 U.S. 1072 (1984); Blanton v. Anzalone, 760 F.2d
989, 992-93 (9th Cir. 1985) (same); E.E.O.C. v. Wooster Brush Co. Employees Relief Ass'n,
727 F.2d 566, 579 (6th Cir. 1984) (asserting that interest awards are within discretion of court);
Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 653 F.2d 1208, 1219 (8th Cir.) (indicating that interest
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tractual" and "extracontractual" by courts when dealing with cases arising
under section 502(a)(3) seems to indicate that the relationship between the
fiduciary and the beneficiary is a contractual relationship. 9 As Justice
Stevens noted in Russell, ERISA's drafters intended the statute to protect
contractually defined benefits. In light of this contractual relationship,
damage awards under ERISA must fit into a dual framework of both trust
and contract remedies.93 Because contract law only provides remedies fore-

awards fall within equitable relief language of ERISA § 502(a)(3)), cert denied 454 U.S. 968
(1981). In awarding interest to the plaintiffs, the court in Dependahl carefully pointed out that
the interest directly resulted from deprivation of contractual benefits which the fiduciary
controlled during the entire period of wrongful deprivation. Id. The Dependahl court stressed
that the defendant continued to have use of the funds. Id.; see also Cefali v. Buffalo Brass
Co., 748 F. Supp 1011 (W.D.N.Y. 1990) (awarding interest under ERISA § 502(a)(3) as
properly defined contractual benefit).
In Cefali, the plaintiff's argued that the Russell decision prohibited the awarding of
prejudgment interest because interest should be characterized as extracontractual rather than
contractual. Id. at 1024. The district court rejected this arguiiient, stating that because a direct
monetary award had already been determined to be due for a breach, the award of interest
on that amount should also be contractual. Id. Therefore, the Cefali court agreed with Russell
that extracontractual damages are beyond the reach of ERISA, but found interest on a proper
damage award recoverable as a contractual claim. Id. The Cefali court also cited post-Russell
cases supporting interest awards. Id.; see also Blanton v. Anzalone, 813 F.2d 1574, 1576 (9th
Cir. 1987) (allowing prejudgment interest award in ERISA suit); Jansen v. Greyhound Corp.,
692 F. Supp. 1029, 1044 (N.D.Iowa 1987) (awarding prejudgment interest); see also infra notes
190-201 and accompanying text (discussing contractual/extracontractual distinction in ERISA
litigation).
92. See Warren v. Society Nat'l Bank, 905 F.2d 975, 977 (6th Cir.) (discussing distinction

between contractual and extracontractual damages in context of ERISA § 502(a)(3)), petition
for cert. filed (1990); Drinkwater v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 846 F.2d 821, 824-25 (1st
Cir.) (discussing definition of term extracontractual), cert. denied 488 U.S. 909 (1988); United
Steelworkers v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1499, 1508 (11th Cir. 1988) (discussing extracontractual damages under ERISA § 502(a)(3)), cert. denied sub nom. H.K. Porter Co. v. United

Steelworkers, 489 U.S. 1096 (1989); Hancock v. Montgomery Ward Long Term Disability
Trust, 787 F.2d 1302, 1307 (9th Cir. 1986) (discussing case arising under ERISA § 502(a)(3));
Powell v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., 780 F.2d 419, 424 (4th Cir. 1985) (discussing

availability of extracontractual damages under ERISA § 502(a)(3)), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1170
(1986).

93. See generally DoBas, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REmms (1973) (discussing remedies
available under contract and trust). Where there has been an express intent to create a trust,
that express intent creates an express trust. Id. at 240. Once parties create an express trust,
the relationship between the parties parallels that of the relationship between parties to an
express contract. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 (1959)). But see 3 SCOTT
& FRATCHER, Tan LAW OF TRusTs § 197.2 at 192 (4th ed. 1988) (stating that trustee is not
liable to beneficiary in contract for breach of trust).
Under contract law, the test laid out in Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng.Rep.
145 (1854) governs the provisions for extracontractual damages. DOaBS, supra, at 804. Under
the Hadley test, as translated today, special damages must be foreseeable to the partiei in
order to be recoverable. DOBBS, supra, at 804; see also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 351 (1981) (stating that damages are not recoverable for loss that parties to contract did not
have reason to foresee). Dobbs contends that an overriding principle of contract law is that
contract damages should be limited in some respect. DoBBs, supra, at 804. American courts
continue to follow this principle, extending the rule of Hadley farther than the Hadley court
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seeable to the parties to the contract, trust law's remedy structure in the
context of a contractual relationship should provide for only those damages
specifically contemplated by the terms of the trust relationship.94 Because

intended. Id. at 805. Extracontractual damages are not always denied in contract claims,
however. In cases where the plaintiff has proven that the parties contemplated certain damages,
courts have granted those damages. Id. at 812. Further, the strict test under Hadley has
become less rigid in recent years, but the Hadley rule continues to remain very complicated.
Id. at 814. Dobbs contends that the proper measure of damages will in the end depend on
the court's view of how the risk had been allocated between the parties, resulting in judgments
not clearly dictated by a rule of law. Id. at 816. Compare Starmakers Publishing Corp. v.
Acme Fast Freight, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 787, 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (denying damages because
no proof of foreseeability) with Havens Steel Co. v. Randolph Engineering Co., 613 F. Supp.
514, 541, (W.D.Mo.1985) (holding damages foreseeable by affirmative action of party to
contract), judgment aff'd 813 F.2d 186 (8th Cir. 1987).
Emotional distress damages require an even higher standard of proof. See RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF CoNTmAcTs § 353 (1959) (requiring that emotional disturbance damages only be
awarded if such damages particularly likely aspect of contract breach). Compare Dean v.
Dean, 821 F.2d 279, 282 (5th Cir. 1987) (finding emotional distress damages denied because
contract did not have personal feelings as its essence), with Huskey v. National Broadcasting
Co., 632 F. Supp. 1282, 1293 (N.D.Ill. 1986) (awarding emotional distress damages because
contract had by its very nature elements of emotional nature). Incorporating contract principles
into a trust law remedy scheme is not the norm, however. See Sinai Hosp. v. National Benefit
Fund for Hosp. & Health Care Employees, 697 F.2d 562, 566 (4th Cir. 1982) (indicating that
courts handling trust disputes should interpret contract principles in light of prevailing tiust
law).
After stating that courts should interpret rules of contract law in trust disputes only in
light of the specific purposes of the involved trust laws, the Sinai court stated that there is no
firmer principle in the common law of trusts than that requiring the trustees to act only in
accordance with the terms of the trust. Id. Supporting the Sinai court's view that contract law
is to be subordinate to trust law in trust cases, Scott, analyzing trust remedies, states that a
trustee is not liable in an action at law for breach of contract unless the trustee has undertaken
to do more than merely administer the trust. 3 Scorr & FRATchER, THE LAW OF TRUSTs §
197.2 (4th ed. 1988). Scott further states that courts do not hold a trustee liable in contract
because the determination of fiduciary conduct necessary to determine breach of contract at
law is only proper in equity. Id.; see also Nedd v. Thomas, 316 F. Supp. 74, 76-77 (M.D.Pa.
1970) (stating that questions of trust administration are better handled in equity). Scott's
analysis highlights the difficulty of attempting to combine the remedy principles of contract
and trust together. 3 ScoTT & FRATCHER, TaE LAW OF TRusTs § 197.2 (4th ed. 1988). However,
the development of ERISA's remedy structure seems to require some grafting of contract
principles onto the overriding dominance of trust law. See supra note 92 and accompanying
text (discussing use of contractual terms in ERISA decisions). This uncomfortable mix can
only be accomplished if trust law continues to dominate the remedial scheme, with contract
principles only used in very rare circumstances such as defining the extracontractual/contractual
distinction of direct and indirect damages. See Sinai, 697 F.2d at 566 (asserting that contract
law subordinate to trust law in trust cases).
94. See G.G. BoaaRT & G.T. BoGERT, TRusTs AND TRusTms § 862 (rev. 2d ed. 1982)
(discussing possible damage awards under the law of trusts). The argument for foreseeability
is not made without an understanding of the possible harm the beneficiary may suffer due to
a breach of the trust. When a fiduciary disallows benefits under a trust, the fiduciary's
determination may deny the beneficiary a very necessary source of income. See McRae v.
Seafarers' Welfare Plan, 726 F. Supp. 817, 818-20 (S.D.Ala. 1989) (discussing effect of loss
of benefit income), rev'd 920 F.2d 819 (11th Cir. 1991). The provisions for monetary damage
awards under trust law, however, are very specific. G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, TRusTs
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trust law is equitable and Congress designed ERISA to be an equitable
statute using the principles of trust law, 95 the use of contractual language
by courts does not necessarily imply room for legal contractual remedies."
Justice Brennan's assertion in his concurrence in Russell that the incorporation of trust law allows for extracontractual damages under ERISA,
therefore, is not necessarily as "black letter" as Justice Brennan indicated.
Because of the strong concurring opinion and the limited holding of
Russell, the Supreme Court gave lower courts little guidance beyond a
prohibition of individual recovery of extracontractual damages under section
409 of ERISA. The opinion in Russell did not address whether extracontractual compensatory or punitive damages were available under section
502(a)(3) of ERISA.Y The question whether extracontractual damages are

TRuss § 862 (rev. 2d ed. 1982). The beneficiary is not the preferred claimant in a
breach of trust case, and therefore the individual remedies available are limited to damages
arising directly out of the breach. Id. If damages are direct, then they may be properly viewed
as contractual rather than extracontractual. See infra notes 190-201 and accompanying text
(discussing contractual/extracontractual distinction). In a situation where the damages are
properly direct, it seems that the law of trusts, in equity will allow for an award. G.G. BoaERT
& G.T. BOoaRT, TRusrs AND TRusTEEs § 862 (rev. 2d ed. 1982); see also 3 ScoTT & FRATCHER,
THE LAw oF TRusTs § 205 at 237-43 (4th ed. 1988) (stating that a trustee is chargeable for
loss to trust estate).
The danger arises in determining what damages are direct enough to be properly contractual rather than extracontractual. See In re Trust Under Will of Comstock, 219 Minn.
325, 337, 17 N.W.2d 656, 664 (1945) (holding that trustee not liable for beneficiary's increased
tax burden); In re Wanamaker's Trust Estate, 340 Pa. 419, 422, 17 A.2d 380, 382 (1941)
(finding trustee not liable for increased tax burden of beneficiary). In both Comstock and
Wanamaker, the courts found the trustee beyond liability for actions resulting in higher tax
consequences to the beneficiary because such damages are speculative and indirect. Comstock,
219 Minn. at 337, 17 N.W..2d at 664, Wanamaker, 340 Pa. at 422, 17 A.2d at 382. The
Comstock court further stated that the only measure of damages for failure to pay money
under trust law is not consequential damages but rather only lawful interest accrued upon the
amount due. Comstock, 219 Minn. at 337, 17 N.W.2d at 664. For an extension to ERISA of
the holding that damages must be direct to be within trust principles, see Straub v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 851 F.2d 1262, 1265 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that Congress did not
intend implied rights of action to supplement the express provisions of ERISA) cert. denied,
110 S.Ct. 1166 (1990). After citing Russell for the proposition that a fiduciary could not be
held liable to a beneficiary for extracontractual damages, the Tenth Circuit stated that the
beneficiary had no cause of action under ERISA because he was in fact receiving all benefits
contractually due under the express terms of his plan. Id. at 1266.
95. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989) (stating that
ERISA abounds with language and terminology of trust law); De Nobel v. Vitro Corp., 885
F.2d 1180, 1185 (4th Cir. 1989) (citing Bruch for proposition that ERISA abounds with
terminology of trust law); Nieto v. Ecker 845 F.2d 868, 872 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that
ERISA incorporates trust law); Martens v. Kaiser Steel Retirement Plan, 744 F. Supp. 917,
920 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (citing Nieto for proposition that Congress intended courts to draw on
trust law when formulating remedies under ERISA). q
96. See Sinai Hosp. v. National Benefit Fund For Hosp. & Health Care Employees, 697
F.2d 562, 566 (4th Cir. 1982) (holding that contract law must be interpreted in light of trust
law in trust situations).
97. See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 139 n. 5 (stating
that Court's decision did not reach issue of damages available under § 502(a)(3)). The Russell
AND
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available under ERISA. section 502(a)(3) has been the basis of differing
holdings in the federal district and appellate courts.98

Court stated in a footnote that because the plaintiff had disclaimed any reliance on § 502(a)(3),
the Court did not need to consider whether any other provision of ERISA authorized the
recovery of extracontractual damages. Id.
Because the law after Russell strictly stated that a participant or beneficiary could not
recover extracontractual compensatory or punitive damages individually under § 409 of ERISA,
a second question remained, however, whether, in an action brought by an individual participant
or beneficiary, a plan might recover extracontractual compensatory or punitive damages under
§ 409. The Russell court specifically failed to reach this question. Russell, 473 U.S. at 144 n.
12. Lower court decisions, however, have split on the issue of whether an award of extracontractual compensatory and punitive damages to a plan is appropriate under § 409. See
Shoenholtz v. Doniger, 657 F. Supp. 899, 913-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding awards of extracontractual compensatory and punitive damages to plan appropriate under ERISA § 409);
California Digital Defined Benefit Pension Fund v. Union Bank, 705 F. Supp. 489, 491 (C.D.
Cal. 1989) (allowing plan to sue for punitive damages). The court in Shoenholtz held that
while an action could be brought by an individual beneficiary to a plan, any judgement could
only benefit the plan as a whole. Shoenholtz, 657 F. Supp. at 913. The court further found
that an award of extracontractual damages would be appropriate. Id. The court reasoned that
this interpretation remained consistent with the holding in Russell. Id. But see Sommers Drug
Store Co. Employee Profit Sharing Trust v. Corrigan Enter., 793 F.2d 1456, 1462-65 (5th Cir.
1986) (holding that plan could not recover punitive damages), cert. denied 479 U.S. 1034
(1987). In Sommers, the plaintiff was the entire plan. While the Sommers court agreed that
an action could be brought under § 502(a)(2) or § 502(a)(3), the court reasoned that the same
principles relating to individual awards of extracontractual damages should apply to suits
brought by plans. Id. Having determined to apply the same standards, the court held an award
of extracontractual damages to be inappropriate. Id.
The Shoenholtz decision is criticized in Diduck v. Kaszycki & Sons Contractors, Inc.,
737 F. Supp. 792 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), a case out of the same district court. In Diduck, the
district court acknowledged that a plan could bring an action under 502(a)(2), but concluded
that in light of the legislative history and the Russell decision, the provisions disallowing an
award of extracontractual relief to an individual are equally applicable to a plan. Id. at 806
n. 23. Therefore, a conclusion as to the availability of damages to an individual participant
also should become a conclusion as to the availability of damages to a plan under section
502(a)(2). See infra notes 171-200 and accompanying text (discussing possible conclusions as
to availability of damages to individual under ERISA 502(a)(3)).
98. See e.g. McRae v. Seafarers' Welfare Plan, 920 F.2d 819 (1lth Cir. 1991); Drinkwater
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 846 F.2d 821 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 909 (1988);
Kleinheins v. Lisle Say. Profit Sharing Trust, 810 F.2d 618 (7th Cir. 1987); Sommers Drug
Stores Co. Employee Profit Sharing Trust v. Corrigan Enter., Inc., 793 F.2d 1456 (5th Cir.
1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 1034 and 479 U.S. 1089 (1987); Sokol v. Bernstein, 803 F.2d 532
(9th Cir. 1986); Powell v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., 780 F.2d 419 (4th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1170 (1986); cf. Warren v. Society Nat'l Bank, 905 F.2d 975
(6th Cir. 1990), petition for cert. filed (1990); Vogel v. Independence Federal Say. Bank, 728
F. Supp. 1210 (D. Md. 1990).
Four Circuits have not ruled on the specific issue whether § 502(a)(3) allows for
extracontractual damages. The Eighth Circuit has yet to address the specific issue and the
Second Circuit has specifically avoided any ruling. See Lowen v. Tower Asset Management,
Inc., 829 F.2d 1209, 1221 (2d Cir. 1987) (indicating that court would not address issue unless
specifically presented). The Third Circuit also has not addressed the specific issue, but has
indicated that some of the language in Justice Brennan's Russell concurrence might be
persuasive. See Chait v. Bernstein, 835 F.2d 1017, 1027 (3rd Cir. 1987) (citing Russell
concurrence for proposition that ERISA remedies should be tailored to effectuate fiduciary
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that
ERISA section 502(a)(3) makes no provision for extracontractual damages
in Sokol v. Bernstein." In Sokol an action was brought by the plaintiff, a
beneficiary of a pension plan, against the defendant, the plan administrator,
1
for breach of fiduciary duty. '0
The plaintiff, forced to take the proceeds
of her pension at a disadvantageous time for tax purposes, claimed a
violation of the express written terms of the plan. 10 The plaintiff claimed
damages for lost interest, attorney's fees, and emotional distress.' °2 Citing
Russell, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the reasoning of the Russell Court
supported the proposition that no provision in ERISA authorized an award
of extracontractual damages. 03 The Ninth Circuit further concluded that
rather than reading Russell narrowly, limiting the decision to section 409,
the Russell holding should be read broadly. 104 Placing a great deal of
emphasis on the Russell court's observance of Congress' omission of any
mention of extracontractual damages in general, or emotional distress damages in particular, the court concluded that a prohibition against extracontractual damages should apply to sections 409, 502(a)(2), and 502(a)(3).10 1
duties). The indication from the Chait court is that in the proper circumstances, extracontractual
damages might be available. Id. The Tenth Circuit has also indicated some flexibility in the
equitable relief of ERISA without addressing specific remedies available under § 502(a)(3). See
Anthony v. Texaco, Inc., 803 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1986) (stating that court in equity is not
rigidly confined to specific remedies). While not specifically stating that extracontractual
damages would be available, the Tenth and Third Circuits certainly allowed themselves room
to move within the equitable language of ERISA, indicating alignment with the Russell
concurrence over the majority. Id. See Chait, 835 F.2d at 1027.
99. 803 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1986). In Sokol, the district court found that the fiduciary
duty had been breached and proceeded to award the plaintiff damages including interest,
attorney's fees and an award for emotional distress. Id. at 534. The 9th Circuit affirmed all
findings of the district court except the finding of an award of damages for emotional distress.
Id. at 533.
100. Sokol v. Bernstein, 803 F.2d 532, 533-34 (9th Cir. 1986). R
101. Id. at 533-34. In Sokol, the plaintiff, a beneficiary under an ERISA governed plan,
sued the administrator of the plan for breach of fiduciary duty. Id. The express terms of the
plan stated that the administrator could distribute funds only on the request of the beneficiary.
Id. The administrator in Sokol, however, requested that the plan distribute funds without the
request of the plaintiff. Id. The plaintiff then ordered the administrator to redeposit the funds,
which the administrator eventually did. Id.
102. Id. In Sokol, the district court found for the plaintiff on all claims and awarded her
$1,996.29 in lost interest, $4,000 in medical expenses and damage for emotional distress, and
$5,150 in attorney's fees. Id.
103. Id. at 536-38. See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148
(1985) (highlighting absence in ERISA of express statutory authority for extracontractual
damages). Other courts following the Russell majority opinion in the same manner as the
Sokol court also have held that in no circumstances should an award of extra-contractual
compensatory or punitive damages be allowable under §§ 502(a)(2) or 502(a)(3). See e.g. United
Steelworkers of America v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied
sub nom. H.K. Porter Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 489 U.S. 1096 (1989); Hancock
v. Montgomery Ward Long Term Disability Trust, 787 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1986).
104. Sokol, 803 F.2d at 535-36.
105. Id. at 534-38; see also Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 144 (1985)
(finding nothing in ERISA's express language authorizing award of extracontractual damages).
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Therefore, because the court had found a breach of fiduciary duty, the
Ninth Circuit awarded interest and attorney's fees but denied plaintiff's
claim for emotional distress damages. 1 6
Slightly differing from the Ninth Circuit, the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit also denied a plan participant's claim for
emotional distress damages in Drinkwater v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company. °7 The plaintiff in Drinkwater suffered a heart attack on the job
and began to receive permanent disability benefits.1 0a After determining that
the disability had ceased, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (MetLife),
an ERISA governed insurer, terminated the plaintiff's benefits.' °9 The plaintiff then returned to work and suffered another heart attack on the very
same day.110 The plaintiff sued MetLife under ERISA section 502(a)(3),
seeking compensatory and punitive damages."' Denying both of the plaintiff's damage claims, the First Circuit reasoned, as did the Ninth Circuit in
Sokol, that Congress intended the comprehensive provisions of ERISA to
be the exclusive remedy for beneficiaries under ERISA authorized plans." 2
The First Circuit, however, chose not to focus on an absence of specific
extracontractual relief in ERISA, but noted Congress' use of the term
"equitable" in section 502(a)(3). 11 The First Circuit concluded that the
equitable nature of ERISA could not be read to include extracontractual or
punitive damages but rather could only be read to allow for equitable
4
remedies, limited to declaratory or injunctive relief."
Using a third method of interpretation, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit also denied a plan participant's claim for
extracontractual damages in Powell v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone
Co. 5 In Powell the plaintiff sued her employer, C & P Telephone Company

106. Sokol, 803 F.2d at 534-39.
107. 846 F.2d 821 (1st Cir), cert denied, 488 U.S. 909 (1988).
108. Drinkwater v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 846 F.2d 821, 822 (lst Cir), cert denied,
488 U.S. 909 (1988).
109. Id. at 823.
110. Id.
111. Id. In Drinkwater, the plaintiff sued for compensatory damages of $5,000,000 and
punitive damages of $10,000,000. Id.
112. Id. at 824. In Drinkwater, the court found as persuasive the language of the Supreme
Court's Russell decision stating that Congress intended ERISA's remedy structure to be
exclusive. Id. See Mass. Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146-147 (1985)
(holding that ERISA's remedy structure is comprehensive); see also Ingersoll-Rand Co. v.
McClendon,
U.S. , 111 S.Ct. 478, 485 (1990) (holding ERISA's statutory remedy structure
exclusive); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987) (stating that Congress
designed ERISA's remedy provisions to be exclusive).
113. Drinkwater, 846 F.2d at 825.
114. Id. at 825; see also Sokol v. Bernstein, 803 F.2d 532, 538 (9th Cir. 1986) (asserting
that Congress used term equitable to mean declaratory and injunctive relief); Framingham
Union Hosp., v. Travelers Ins. Co., 744 F. Supp. 29, 32 (D. Mass. 1990) (supporting proposition
that Congress intended equitable relief to mean declaratory and injunctive relief).
115. 780 F.2d 419 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1170 (1986). Although the
plaintiff in Powell had received all benefits due her under the plan, the plaintiff sought $5
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of Virginia, its parent company, American Telephone & Telegraph, and
Connecticut General Life Insurance Company." 6 The plaintiff, a beneficiary
under an ERISA governed employee benefit plan, claimed breaches of
7
various fiduciary duties in the handling of a claim for disability benefits."
The plaintiff argued, as Justice Brennan argued in the Russell concurrence,
that the court should incorporate principles of trust law when awarding
relief under section 502(a)(3), thus allowing for extracontractual damages." 8
The Fourth Circuit, however, rejected the plaintiff's argument, holding that
even if the "other appropriate equitable relief" language of section 502(a)(3)
may in certain circumstances include extracontractual or punitive damages,
this form of relief is generally not available in an action by a beneficiary
against a trustee for a breach of trust." 9 Reading ERISA more liberally

million in extracontractual and punitive damages. Id. at 420. The United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment
and dismissed all of the plaintiff's claims. Id. Holding that ERISA did not provide for
extracontractual or punitive relief under these circumstances, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth'Circuit affirmed the district court's holding. Id.
116. Powell v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 780 F.2d 419, 420 (4th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1170 (1986).
117. Id. In Powell, the plaintiff claimed that the administrators consistently harassed her
and her son, requesting unnecessary medical reports and withholding payments. Id. at 420-21.
118. Id. at 424. See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 156-57
(1985) (Brennan, J., concurring) (asserting that Congress intended courts to incorporate trust
law into ERISA). The Powell court acknowledged that the legislative history supported the
incorporation of trust law. Powell 780 F.2d at 424. See House Report, supra note 14, at 11
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. AND ADINm.NEws at 4650-51 (indicating ERISA intended
to incorporate trust law principles).
119. Powell, 780 F.2d at 424. For the proposition that extracontractual relief is not
available to a beneficiary in an action for breach of trust, the Powell court cited to the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, BOGERT, TRusTs & TRusTEES, and SCOTT, Tm LAW OF
TRusTs. Id. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 205 (1959) (defining remedies available
to beneficiary where trustee has breached trust); G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, TRUSTS &
TRusTEES § 862 (rev. 2d ed. 1982) (stating that trustee is usually only charged with loss in
value of trust estate); 3 SCOTT & FRATCHER, Tim LAW OF TRUSTS, § 198.1 at 198 (4th ed.
1988) (stating that beneficiary cannot maintain action at law against trustee not under immediate
and unconditional duty to pay money). See supra notes 83-96 and accompanying text (discussing
remedial principles under trust law).
For case law agreeing with the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit, see Kleinhans v. Lisle
Sav. Profit Sharing Trust, 810 F.2d 618, 627 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding punitive damages not
available in action brought pursuant to § 502(a)(3) of ERISA); Varhola v. Doe, 820 F.2d 809,
817 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding punitive damages not available under § 502(a)(3)). Finding that
punitive damages are not recoverable under § 502(a)(3), the Kleinhans court cited the fact that
punitive damages are generally not recoverable from trustees under the law of trusts for breach
of fiduciary duty. Kleinhans, 810 F.2d at 627. The court agreed that Congress had intended
for ERISA to incorporate principles of trust law but the Seventh Circuit would "not interpret
ERISA to provide punitive damages for breach of a trustee's fiduciary obligations where such
damages are not generally available under the law of trusts." Id.
The Varhola court held that punitive damages are ordinarily not available under trust
law in an action for a breach of a trustee's fiduciary duty. Varhola, 820 F.2d at 817. Citing
to Kleinhans, the court was not prepared to allow such damages without express statutory
authority to do so. Id.
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than the First and Ninth Circuits, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that the
provisions of ERISA, combined with common law trust principles, provided
the possible authority for an award of extracontractual damages.' 2° The
Fourth Circuit, however, reasoned that the fiduciary relationship in an
ERISA plan context is analogous to the relationship between a beneficiary
and trustee. 21 Extending its conclusion that extracontractual damages are
unavailable in an action by a beneficiary against a trustee for a breach of
trust, the Fourth Circuit found an award of extracontractual damages
inappropriate under section 502(a)(3) for the plan administrator's breach of
fiduciary duties.' 22
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district
court award of extracontractual damages in McRae v. Seafarers' Welfare
Plan.'2 In McRae the plaintiff qualified as a participant under an ERISA
governed employee benefit plan. 12 The plan administrator told the plaintiff
that certain surgery would be covered by the plan.' 25 After receiving this
affirmative statement of coverage, the plaintiff incurred surgical expenses
beyond what the plaintiff could afford without coverage.'2 After the plaintiff had surgery, the plan reversed its prior decision regarding coverage and
refused to pay.'17 Because of the subsequent debt, the plaintiff suffered loss
of credit and harassment by collection agencies.1 28 The plaintiff sued for
the amount of lost benefits as well as extracontractual damages for emotional
distress and attorneys fees. 29 The United States District Court for the
Southern District of Alabama awarded plaintiff lost benefits and attorney's
fees as well as extracontractual damages of $50,000:130 The district court
looked to the specific language of section 502(a)(3) providing for "other
appropriate equitable relief" in conjunction with the concurring opinion of

120. Powell, 780 F.2d at'424. The Powell court did indicate that other appropriate
equitable relief might include extracontractual damages in the proper circumstances. Id. In this
case, however, where a beneficiary sued a fiduciary for breach of trust, such proper circumstances did not exist. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 424-25. The Powell court did acknowledge that one proper circumstance for
an extracontractual award might occur when the misconduct rose to the level of willful
misconduct sufficient to subject the fiduciary to ERISA's criminal provisions. Id. at 424 n. 8.
See 29 U.S.C. § 1131 (1988) (defining criminal conduct under ERISA).
123. 920 F.2d 819 (11th Cir. 1991).
124. McRae v. Seafarers' Welfare Plan, 726 F. Supp. 817, 818 (S.D. Ala. 1989), rev'd
920 F.2d 819 (11th Cir. 1991).
125. Id. In McRae, the plaintiff introduced into evidence a note written by an insurance
clerk stating that the insurer had verified coverage of 80% of the plaintiff's surgery, a tubal
reversal. Id.
126. Id. at 819. In McRae, the plaintiff's expenses included anesthesia services at a cost
of $700.00, two hospital charges of $3,112.03 and $142.06, respectively, and a doctor's bill of
$3,086.60. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 820.
129. Id. at 820-21.
130. Id. at 822.
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Justice Brennan in Russell. 3 ' Determining that the Russell opinion did not
preclude an award of extracontractual damages, the district court applied

Justice Brennan's reasoning in Russell that trust law principles should be
incorporated into the enforcement provisions of ERISA.112 Further citing
Justice Brennan's concurrence in Russell, the district court concluded that
trust law allowed for any remedy which would fully protect the interests of
the participant. 13 3 In reversing the district court, the Eleventh Circuit stated
that authority existed in the Eleventh Circuit as well as other Circuits
indicating the unavailability of extracontractual damages under section
502(a)(3).' 3 4 The Court of Appeals did, however, acknowledge the existence

131. Id.at 821.
132. Id.; see also Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 156-57
(1985) (concurring opinion of Brennan, J.) (asserting that Congress intended to incorporate
trust law into ERISA).
133. McRae, 726 F. Supp. at 821 (S.D.Ala. 1989), rev'd 920 F.2d 819 (lth Cir. 1991);
see also Smith v. ABS Indus., Inc., 653 F. Supp. 94, 99-100 (N.D. Ohio 1986) (holding that
neither Russell nor ERISA preclude award of extracontractual damages). In Smith the district
court ruled, similarly to McRae, that nothing in the holding of Russell precluded an award of
extracontractual damages under § 502(a)(3). Id. at 99. The Smith court acknowledged the
Russell court's statement that the six carefully integrated enforcement provisions indicated that
Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies. Id. at 99; see also Massachusetts Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146 (1985) (stating that ERISA's strict enforcement
scheme did not allow other remedies). However, the district court still found no direct command
from Russell prohibiting 'an allowance of extracontractual damages. Smith, 653 F. Supp. at
99. The district court, therefore, allowed the plaintiff's complaint for extracontractual and
punitive damages to stand. Id. at 100. For a similar holding, see James A. Dooley Assoc.
Employees Retirement Plan v. Reynolds, 654 F. Supp. 457, 460-61 (E.D.Mo. 1987) (allowing
claim for extracontractual damages to stand). The Dooley court cites case law besides Russell
for the proposition that punitive damages should be available under ERISA, only citing Russell
in a footnote, to state, similarly to the McRae court, that the Russell Court did not resolve
whether extracontractual damages could be recovered under ERISA § 502(a)(3). Id. at 461;
see also Russell, 473 U.S. at 139 n. 5 (stating that Russell holding does not reach ERISA §
502(a)(3)).
134. McRae v. Seafarers' Welfare Plan, 920 F.2d 819, 822 (11th Cir. 1991). The McRae
court cites to several cases both within the circuit and outside the circuit. Id.; see also Amos
v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Ala., 868 F.2d 430, 431 n. 2 (lth Cir.) (stating that Eleventh
Circuit continually denies extracontractual damages under ERISA § 502(a)(3)), cert. denied
110 S.Ct. 158 (1989); United Steelworkers v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1499, 1509 (lth
Cir. 1988) (stating that equitable nature of ERISA prevents recovery of extracontractual
damages), cert. denied sub nom., H.K. Porter Co. v. United Steelworkers, 489 U.S. 1096
(1989); Bishop v. Osborn Transp., Inc., 838 F.2d 1173, 1174 (lth Cir 1988) (highlighting lack
of provision for extracontractual damages in ERISA § 502(a)), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 832
(1988); Varhola v. Doe, 820 F.2d 809, 817 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding punitive damages unavailable
under ERISA § 502(a)(3)); Kleinhans v. Lisle Say. Profit Sharing Trust, 810 F.2d 618, 626-27
(7th Cir. 1987) (citing to Russell for proposition that punitive damages unavailable under
ERISA § 502(a)(3)); Sokol v. Bernstein, 803 F.2d 532, 534 (9th Cir. 1986) (concluding
extracontractual damages unavailable under ERISA § 502(a)(3)); Sommers Drug Stores Co.
Employee Profit Sharing Trust v. Corrigan Enter., Inc., 793 F.2d 1456, 1462-65 (5th Cir.
1986) (holding punitive damages unrecoverable under §§ 502(a)(3) and 409), cert. denied 479
U.S. 1034 and 479 U.S. 1089 (1987); Powell v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 780 F.2d
419, 424 (4th Cir. 1985) (denying extracontractual damage award), cert. denied 476 U.S. 1170
(1986); Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 653 F.2d 1208, 1216 (8th Cir. 1981) (asserting
punitive damages unavailable under ERISA), cert. denied 454 U.S. 968 (1981).
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of a 1988 report by the House Education and Labor Committee, cited by
the plaintiffs.'35 In this report, which the House Committee on the Budget
adopted, the Committee reaffirmed the authority of the courts to shape
legal and equitable remedies under ERISA, including, in the proper circumstances, punitive damages. 3 6 The Eleventh Circuit, however, placed little
weight in the report, stating that while the existence of the report evidenced
Congressional concern over extracontractual remedies, Congress had not
acted to provide any explicit remedy.1 37 Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit
refused to create a federal common law remedy in the face of clear adverse
38
precedent.
Despite the rejection of extracontractual damages in the First, Fourth,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit awarded monetary damages to a plan participant in Warren
v. Society National Bank. 39 In Warren the plaintiff qualified for benefits
under two employee benefit plans."4' The plans allowed the plaintiff to take
4
payments either in a single lump-sum payment or over a period of time.' '
Because of tax benefits, the plaintiff opted for the lump-sum option,
ordering the plan administrator to transfer the plaintiff's retirement plan
assets to an investment banking firm. 42 The plan administrator delayed the

135. McRae, 920 F.2d at 822; see also H.R. REP. No. 101-247, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
55-56 reprinted in 1989 U.S. CODE CoNo. AND AD N. NEws at 1947-48 (stating that federal
courts should fashion federal common law with respect to employee benefit plans).
136. See H.R. REP. No. 247, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 55-56 reprinted in 1989 U.S. CODE
CONG. AND ADmN. NEws at 1947-48 (reaffirming authority of courts to shape federal common
law around ERISA's remedy provisions).
137. See McRae, 920 F.2d at 822 (observing no explicit Congressional enactment despite
concerns over remedial needs of ERISA); see also H.R. REP. No. 247, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
at 56, reprinted in 1989 U.S. CODE CONG. AND ADmm. NEws at 1948 (indicating that while
Committee considered amending statute, such action unnecessary). The Committee on Education and Labor stated that over the years the Committee considered amending ERISA, but
that in light of the legislative history of the statute allowing for federal law to develop, the
Committee reasoned that action was unnecessary. Id.
138. McRae, 920 F.2d at 822.
139. 905 F.2d 975 (6th Cir.), petition for cert. filed (1990). While a majority of the court
in Warren held that the plaintiff could recover damages, one judge filed a strong dissent
arguing that the majority holding in Russell as well as authority in other circuits should
preclude awards of extracontractual damages. Id. at 984-86 (Wellford, C.J., dissenting). The
dissent stated that the tax losses suffered by the plaintiff were extracontractual and therefore
unrecoverable in view of the clear precedent barring extracontractual recovery under ERISA §
502(a)(3). Id.; see also infra notes 99-138 and accompanying text (discussing cases holding
extracontractual recovery beyond provisions of ERISA § 502).
140. Warren v. Society Nat. Bank, 905 F.2d 975, 976 (6th Cir.), petition for cert. filed
(1990). In Warren, the plaintiff participated in a pension plan and a profit sharing plan and
trust. Id. See infra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing definition of plan).
141. Id. In Warren, by an express provision of the plaintiff's plan, the plaintiff could
take out all accrued benefits at one time, thus termed a lump sum option. Id.; see also BRUCE,
supra note 2 at 249-50 (discussing lump sum benefits); CANAN, supra note 27 at 102-103
(discussing distribution of benefits); 29 U.S.C. § 1056 (defining rules concerning form and
payment of benefits).
142. Warren, 905 F.2d at 976. The plaintiff in Warren hoped to put the funds from his

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:691

transfer of funds subjecting plaintiff to a tax loss. 43 The plaintiff sued the
plan administrator for damages under section 502(a)(3) of ERISA.'" Reversing a district court decision denying monetary relief as extracontractual' 4 ,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit carefully avoided
drawing distinct lines between extracontractual and contractual damages.'"
After determining that the Supreme Court in Russell had not reached the
issue of damage awards under section 502(a)(3), the Sixth Circuit agreed
with Justice Brennan's approach in Russell that courts deciding ERISA
issues should apply black letter trust law by placing strict duties on fiduciaries running directly to beneficiaries in the administration of trust benefits. 47 Citing Brennan's concurrence in Russell, the Sixth Circuit also stated
that, under trust law, a beneficiary is entitled to a remedy that will put the
beneficiary in the position that the beneficiary would have been in had
there been no breach of trust.'" The Sixth Circuit, still relying on Brennan's

plan into an Individual Retirement Account, thus continuing to defer his income tax liability.
Id.
143. Id. In Warren, the transfer of plaintiff's funds occurred beyond the end of the
plaintiff's tax year, thus subjecting the plaintiff to income tax on those funds. Id. For a
general discussion of the tax consequences involved in ERISA and Individual Retirement
Accounts (IRA), see CNAN, supra note 27, at 175-81 (discussing taxation with respect to
IRAs).
144. Warren, 905 F.2d at 976. In Warren, the plaintiff's amended complaint alleged total
losses to the plaintiff in the amount of $375,430. Id. The alleged losses constituted a combined
tax loss as well as lost future income on those funds used to pay the tax. Id.
145. Id. In Warren, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio,
in an unpublished decision, dismissed the plaintiff's claim against SNB, holding that damages
were not available to a plan participant under § 502(a)(3). Id. In discussing -Russell,the district
court noted that the Supreme Court did not define the term "extracontractua" damages which
the plaintiff in Russell was seeking. Id. The district court determined that the damages Dr.
Warren sought were properly defined as extracontractual and therefore not recoverable as
beyond the relief provisions of ERISA. Id. The district court also reasoned that "other
appropriate equitable relief," as used in section 503(a)(3) should be limited to injunctive or
declaratory relief. Id. Citing Drinkwater v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 846 F.2d 821 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 909 (1988), the district court found these conclusions to be fully
supported by the common law of trusts. Warren, 905 F.2d at 978.
146. Id. at 978-79. The Warren court was careful not to define contractual damages as
only those due under the specific terms of the plan. Id. at 979-81; cf. Drinkwater v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 846 F.2d 821 (1st Cir.) (defining extracontractual damages as those
due beyond express provisions of plan), cert. denied 488 U.S. 909 (1988).
147. Id. at 979. The Warren court stated that whenever a fiduciary breaches the duties
set forth in §404(a), the beneficiary should be allowed appropriate equitable relief as against
the fiduciary. Id. The court finds authority for this in Brennan's Russell concurrence. Id.; see
also Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 154 (1985) (Brennan, J.
concurring) (stating that beneficiary may obtain appropriate equitable relief whenever fiduciary
breaches duties set forth in ERISA §404(a)); supra notes 83-96 and accompanying text
(discussing principles of trust law).
148. Warren, 905 F.2d at 979; see also Russell, 473 U.S. at 157 (contending that beneficiary
in trust law is entitled to remedy that will put beneficiary in position beneficiary would have
been in had there been no breach of trust); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRusTs § 205 and
comment a (1959) (stating that beneficiary is entitled to remedy that will put beneficiary into
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concurrence in Russell, further reasoned that by construing ERISA sections

404(a) and 502(a)(3) together, a court could find grounds for an award of
49

monetary damages.
Attempting to distinguish its holding from the Russell majority as well
as the First, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits, the Sixth Circuit asserted that the
plaintiff in Warren did not seek the same type of extracontractual relief
that the plaintiff sought in Russell.50 Determining that the claim for damages
fell within the scope of the section 502(a)(3) "other appropriate equitable
relief," the Sixth Circuit distinguished the damages sought in Warren by
noting that the plaintiff in Russell sought damages for emotional distress.15,
Using principles of trust law, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that while monetary
damages would not be appropriate in an emotional distress case, monetary
damages would be appropriate in a case where injury was directly attributable to the breach of trust.1' 2 The Sixth Circuit distinguished its award
of monetary damages from cases in other circuits which had found no
authority for such an award by construing the award of damages as
contractual rather than extracontractual, and therefore properly recoverable

same position as prior to breach of trust); supra notes 83-96 and accompanying text (discussing
principles of trust law). The Warren court cites several cases for the proposition that courts
may tailor remedies to afford the most complete relief. Warren, 905 F.2d at 982; see also
United States v. Martinson, 809 F.2d 1364, 1367 (9th Cir. 1987) (asserting that court in equity
has power to adjust remedies to allow for complete relief); Goldberg v. Medtronic, Inc., 686
F.2d 1219, 1229 (7th Cir. 1982) (stating that court in equity has power to fashion remedy to
do complete justice, including monetary award); Walters v. Marathon Oil Co., 642 F.2d 1098,
1100 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding equity court has power to award monetary remedies to effectuate
complete justice). None of these cases cited, however, revolves around an issue in trust or
under ERISA. Cf. supra notes 83-170 and accompanying text (discussing reluctance of courts
to award monetary damages in trust and ERISA cases).
149. Warren, 905 F.2d at 979; see also Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473
U.S. 134, 154 n. 10 and 157 n. 16 (1985) (stating that beneficiary is entitled to remedy,
including monetary damages, which will put beneficiary in position beneficiary would have
been in had no breach of trust occurred); supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text (discussing
fiduciary duties under ERISA § 404 and remedies under § 502(a)(3)); supra notes 83-96 and
accompanying text (discussing remedial principles of trust law).
150. Warren, 905 F.2d at 979-80. Cf. Drinkwater v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 846 F.2d
821, 824 (1st Cir.) (holding extracontractual damages unavailable under ERISA § 502(a)(3)),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 909 (1988); Powell v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 780 F.2d 419,
424 (4th Cir. 1985) (finding no provision in ERISA for extracontractual damages), cert. denied
476 U.S. 1170 (1986); Sokol v. Bernstein, 803 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1986) (same); see also Davis
v. Kentucky Finance Cos. Retirement Plan, 887 F.2d 689 (6th Cir. 1989) (stating that there
could be no extracontractual recovery in context of ERISA plan), cert. denied 110 S.Ct. 1924
(1990).

151. Warren, 905 F.2d at 980; see also Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473
U.S. 134, 137 (1985) (stating that plaintiff's request for damages was based on reduction of
psychological condition); Sokol v. Bernstein, 803 F.2d 532, 533 (9th Cir. 1986) (indicating that

extracontractual damages sought by plaintiff were for emotional distress).
152. Warren, 905 F.2d at 982. See REsTATamENT (SEcoND) op TRusTs § 205 comment a
(1959) (stating that trust remedies designed to put beneficiary in position beneficiary would
have been in had no breach of trust occurred); see also supra notes 83-96 and accompanying
text (discussing trust law remedy principles).
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under section 502(a)(3)'s "other appropriate equitable relief" language. 53
The Sixth Circuit concluded, therefore, that the loss of tax benefit due to
administrator error was a direct contractual 54loss to the participant and
should be recoverable under section 502(a)(3).
Conceding that ERISA made no provision for extracontractual damage
awards, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, in
Vogel v. Independence Federal Savings Bank, 55 found a monetary award
justified under ERISA section 502(a)(3) as a contractual rather than extracontractual loss.'56 In Vogel the plaintiff received permanent and total

disability benefits under an ERISA governed insurance plan through the
plaintiff's prior employer. 157 The employer, however, changed insurance
carriers and terminated the benefits the plaintiff was receiving.

5

Due to

this termination in benefits, the plaintiff's family spent considerable sums
of money in order to care for the plaintiff. 59 The quality of the plaintiff's
medical care declined and the plaintiff eventually died.'6° The estate of the
plaintiff sued the employer, the health insurer and the insurance agency

seeking compensatory damages for out-of-pocket expenses, extreme emotional distress, pain and suffering, and wrongful death. 16' The court dismissed all the claims except the claim for out-of-pocket expenses. 62 The
court characterized the claims for emotional distress, pain and suffering
and wrongful death as extracontractual, concluding, in line with the Russell
majority, that the plaintiff could not recover damages on these claims. 163
The district court, however, held that the plaintiff's estate could recover

out-of-pocket expenses for care of the plaintiff. 164 Although agreeing with
153. Warren, 905 F.2d at 982. The Warren court stated that the tax and tax interest
liability, as well as loss of investment earnings were direct injuries to the plaintiff resulting
from the bank's failure to follow plaintiff's instructions. Id. Cf. supra notes 99-138 and
accompanying text (discussing cases in which courts refused to award extracontractual damages).
154. Warren, 905 F.2d at 982. The Warren court points out that one reason plans include
lump sum distributions is the knowledge that these distributions receive extremely favorable
tax treatment. Id. The Warren court, therefore determined that the favorable tax consequences
of plaintiff's lump sum option became part of the contractual terms of the plan. Id.; see also
CANAN, supra note 27, at 477-92 (discussing favorable tax consequences of lump sum distributions).
155. 728 F. Supp. 1210 (D.Md. 1990).
156. Vogel v. Independence Federal Say. Bank, 728 F. Supp. 1210, 1214-35 (D. Md.
1990).
157. Id. at 1214-15.
158. Id. at 1215.
159. Id. at 1216.
160. Id. at 1217.
161. Id. at 1228. The employer in Vogel also counterclaimed in the suit, seeking recovery
of $720,000 in benefits paid for the care of the plaintiff, stating that plaintiff was never
entitled to receive benefits. Id. at 1232-33. The court granted summary judgment for the
plaintiffs on the counterclaim. Id. at 1233-34.
162. Id. at 1228-30.
163. Id.; see also Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148 (1985)
(stating that ERISA did not provide for extracontractual damages).
164. Vogel, 728 F. Supp. at 1228-29.
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the Russell holding that ERISA does not provide for extracontractual
damages, the district court asserted that Russell did not support the contention that all claims for damages by an individual in a suit for breach of
fiduciary duty must be dismissed. 16 Similar to the Sixth Circuit in Warren,
the District Court distinguished extracontractual damages from those damages resulting directly from a breach.166 In Vogel the court reasoned that
the defendant bank terminated the plaintiff's benefits, forcing expenditures
of money for services that should have been covered by the plan.1 67 The
district court held that these expenditures were sufficiently ,proximate to the
breach to allow for the plaintiff's estate to seek recovery under section 409
of ERISA.' 68 The Vogel court stated that as long as the damages were
properly classified as contractual, the damages could be recoverable.1 69 The
Vogel court drew an important distinction between the characterization of
damages as extracontractual or contractual, concluding that all damages
properly construed as contractual are recoverable, while all damages properly
1 70
construed as extracontractual are unrecoverable.
As seen by the conflicting judicial opinions, the availability of extracontractual damages under section 502(a)(3) remains unsettled.17 1 Proponents
of damage awards under section 502(a)(3) assert that the language of the
statute stating "other appropriate equitable relief" should be read broadly.1 72
These proponents believe that the principles of trust law do in fact allow
monetary damages if monetary damages are the only remedy which would
afford complete relief.173 Both the Warren court and the district court in
McRae reasoned that the only relief that would properly make a party

165. Id. See supra notes 48-72 and accompanying text (discussing holding of Russell).
166. Id. at 1229; see also Warren v. Society Nat'l Bank, 905 F.2d 975, 980 (6th Cir.
1990) (distinguishing extracontractual damages from contractual damages).
167. Vogel, 728 F. Supp. at 1214-16.
168. Id. at 1228-29. The Vogel court found provision in ERISA § 409 for an individual
award of monetary damages despite the overriding language in both Russell and § 409 that
relief is plan related. Id.; see also Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134,
140-42 (1985) (holding that ERISA § 409 designed to benefit plan); 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (1988),
ERISA § 409 (discussing remedies for fiduciary breach).
169. Vogel, 728 F. Supp. at 1229.
170. Id. The Vogel court found nothing in the Russell opinion to indicate a prohibition
against contractual damage recovery, even under ERISA § 409. Id.; cf. Massachusetts Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148 (1985) (holding recovery of extracontractual
damages beyond provisions of ERISA § 409).
171. See supra notes 99-170 and accompanying text (discussing conflicting decisions as to
availability of extracontractual damages under ERISA).
172. See e.g. Warren v. Society Nat'l Bank, 905 F.2d 975 (6th Cir.), petition for cert.
filed (1990); Vogel v. Independence Federal Say. Bank, 728 F. Supp. 1210 (D. Md. 1990);
McRae v. Seafarers' Welfare Plan, 726 F. Supp. 817 (S.D. Ala. 1989), rev'd 920 F.2d 819
(1991); see also supra notes 130-33 and 139-70 and accompanying text (discussing courts' broad
reading of ERISA's equitable language).
173. See supra notes 130-33 and 139-70 and accompanying text (discussing certain courts'
assertions that certain monetary damages are proper under ERISA).

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:691

whole would be monetary damages. 174 These courts reasoned that because
the statute is silent on whether extracontractual relief should be available,
that silence should not be read to limit the statute, but rather should be
read to allow courts the discretion in equity to afford the most complete
relief courts can. 1' 5 Proponents of damage awards also assert that nothing
in the Supreme Court's Russell decision specifically forbids extracontractual
damage awards under section 502(a)(3).176 Because a lack of a specific
holding indicates an absence of established law on the matter, proponents
see nothing limiting a court's discretion on the matter.'" Congress, however,
drafted ERISA as a comprehensive statute. 78 The extensive remedy provisions show an unusually high amount of attention to detail. 79 If Congress
had intended to allow for extracontractual relief under ERISA, Congress
quite easily could have provided specifically for extracontractual relief.8 0
The original drafts of ERISA contained language providing for both equitable and legal relief, yet no provision for legal relief survived final enactment of ERISA. 181 The omission of legal relief indicates that Congress
understood the distinction between legal and equitable relief and chose to
authorize only the latter.1 2 ERISA does in fact provide for injunctions,
removal of fiduciaries, and attorneys fees." 3

174. See Warren 905 F.2d at 982 (asserting that monetary damages are the only remedy
which would afford complete relief to plaintiff); McRae, 726 F. Supp at 822 (holding that
monetary damages are only remedy affording complete relief).
175. See Warren, 905 F.2d at 982 (reading ERISA to allow monetary damage awards at
discretion of court); McRae, 726 F. Supp. at 822 (asserting that ERISA allows courts discretion
to award damages).
176. See supra notes 132-33 and 147-49 and accompanying text (discussing assertion that
nothing in Supreme Court's Russell holding forbids extracontractual damages under ERISA §

502(a)(3)).
177. See supra notes 131-33 and 145-49 and accompanying text (discussing courts' interpretations of limited holding of Russell).
178. See supra notes 30-47 and 67-71 and accompanying text (discussing comprehensive
remedy structure of ERISA).
179. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1988), ERISA § 502(a) (detailing ERISA's comprehensive
enforcement scheme).
180. See U.S. CoNsT. Art. II (giving Congress power to enact all laws); see also House
Report, supra note 14, at I reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. AND AamN. NEWS at 4639
(recommending that Congress pass amendments to Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act);
H.R. REP. 101-247, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 56 reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CoNG. AND ADMIN.

NEws at 1948 (stating that issue of preemption and civil remedies under ERISA is within
exclusive purview of labor committees of Congress).
181. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1988), ERISA § 502(a)(3) (providing for other appropriate

equitable relief); 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (1988), ERISA § 409 (providing for equitable as opposed
to legal relief); see also supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text (discussing Russell Court's
distinction between equitable and legal relief in ERISA).
182. See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text (discussing Russell Court's assertion

that Congress only intended remedies specifically expressed in ERISA); see also supra notes
92-95 and accompanying text (discussing equitable remedies under trust law and legal remedies
under contract law).
183. See supra notes 30-47 and accompanying text (discussing remedial provisions under
ERISA § 502(a).
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Proponents of extracontractual damage awards also argue that the
incorporation of trust law principles into ERISA's enforcement scheme
should allow for extracontractual damage awards, because trust law allows
any remedy which will put the injured party in the same position as before
the breach of trust.es4 Viewing trust law's remedial principles in the context
of ERISA's comprehensive remedial scheme, the application of trust law
should not expand ERISA. r8o ERISA specifically states that a civil action
may be brought by a participant or beneficiary to obtain other appropriate
equitable relief. 86 Although the legislative history indicates that the drafters
designed the enforcement provisions to provide equitable and legal relief' ,
the reference to legal relief did not survive the final enactment of the bill.18
Interpreting the wording of the statute as well as the principles of trust law
behind the statute, extracontractual damages do not properly fit into the
remedial scheme of the statute.8 9
The Vogel court, recognizing the precedent against awards of extracontractual damages, held that ERISA's incorporation of trust law still allows
for those damages directly traceable to the breach of the contractual terms
of the trust.19 The Warren court similarly reasoned that if damages attrib-

utable to the breach of the fiduciary duty are direct, then these damages
are contractual rather than extracontractual.' 91 While the Vogel and Warren
184. See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 157, and n. 16 (1985)
(concurring opinion of Brennan, J.) (asserting that trust law allows for remedies that put
beneficiary in position beneficiary in before breach of trust); Warren v. Society Nat'l Bank,
905 F.2d 975, 979 (6th Cir.), petition for cert. filed (1990) (same); see also supra notes 83-96
and accompanying text (discussing trust law remedies).
185. See Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 147 (1985) (showing reluctance to tamper with comprehensively designed statute). The Russell majority hesitated to read into ERISA remedies not
explicitly provided for by Congress. Id. Other Courts have reaffirmed this proposition. See,
e.g., Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 91 (1981); Middlesex County
Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1981); Texas Indus. Inc.
v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639-40 (1981); California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S.
287, 295, n. 6 (1981); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979);
National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458
(1974); Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373, 375-376 (1958), reh'g denied, 355
U.S. 907 (1958); Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297, 301 (1943);
Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 289,(1929).
186. See 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (1988), ERISA § 409 (stating that beneficiary may obtain
equitable relief); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1988), ERISA § 502(a) (stating that beneficiary may
bring action for equitable relief).
187. See House Report, supra note 14, at 17 reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CoNo. ND
ADmN. NEws at 4655 (asserting that ERISA provides for both legal and equitable relief).
188. See supra note 181 and accompanying text (discussing omission of legal relief in
final enactment of ERISA).
189. See supra notes 30-47 and accompanying text (discussing remedial provisions of
ERISA); supra notes 83-96 and accompanying text (discussing principles of trust law).
190. See Vogel v. Independence Federal Savings Bank, 728 F. Supp. 1210, 1228 (D. Md.
1990) (holding damages directly traceable to breach of fiduciary duty recoverable under ERISA).
191. See Warren v. Society Nat'l Bank, 905 F.2d 975, 982 (6th Cir.), petition for cert.
filed (1990) (holding award of damages distinguishable from extracontractual awards granted
by other courts).
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courts' reasoning is sound on its face, this reasoning fails under closer

analysis. Trust remedies constitute only those losses due under the contractual terms of the trust.192 The term extracontractual properly defines damages
proximately caused by a breach of trust. 193 To read the term any other way

is to defeat the distinction between contractual and extracontractual. While
the Warren court was careful to distinguish tax benefits from emotional
distress'4, the implications are the same. As Justice Stevens stated in Russell,

ERISA's drafters intended the statute to protect contractually defined benefits.19s Such benefits include those benefits expressly enumerated by the
terms of the plan.'9 If a line must be drawn between extracontractual and
contractual damages, the plans themselves should determine the distinction

by defining expressly what benefits are due.'9 While a tax advantage might
be a favorable consequence of receiving a contractually defined benefit, a
tax advantage is not contractual unless expressly provided for by the terms
of the plan.1 98 If courts award damages outside of the benefits due under

the express terms of the plan, then these damages are extracontractual and
should be treated as such.'9 As the McRae decision illustrates, clearly
extracontractual damages such as emotional distress are facing an ever

increasing body of precedent disallowing an award. 200 In light of this
majority of case law denying relief properly termed extracontractual 2

1,

192. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text (concluding that trust law remedies
include only those due under express terms of plan).
193. See Drinkwater v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 846 F.2d 821, 826 (lst Cir. 1988)
(stating that extracontractual damages are those awarded beyond the express terms of plan),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 909 (1988); see also Warren, 905 F.2d 975, 985-86 (Wellford, J.,
dissenting) (stating that claim for lost tax benefits is extracontractual).
194. See Warren, 905 F.2d at 980 (distinguishing tax benefits from emotional distress
awards).
195. See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148 (1985) (stating
that Congress emphasized protection of contractually defined benefits); Nachman Corp. v.
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. 446 U.S. 359, 374-75 (1980) (indicating that Congress intended
to insure security of defined benefits).
196. See BRUCE, supra note 2, at 115-32 (discussing accrual rules of defined benefit plans);
CANAN, supra note 27, at 292-97 (discussing nature of accrued benefits for defined benefit
plans).
197. See BRUCE, supra note 2, at 46-101 (discussing flexibility of benefit and contribution
formulas in employee benefit plans); CANAN¢, supra note 27, at 131 (asserting that benefit
formulas for pension plans must have definitely determinable benefit).
198. See Warren v. Society Nat'l Bank, 905 F.2d 975, 985-86 (6th Cir. 1990) (Wellford,
C.J., dissenting) (asserting that lost tax benefit is extracontractual); see also supra note 94 and
accompanying text (discussing trust law decisions refusing to award damages for tax losses as
too remote from trust terms).
199. See Drinkwater v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 846 F.2d 821, 824 (1st Cir. 1988)
(stating that damages are extracontractual if not within terms of plan), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
909 (1988); see also supra notes 99-138 and accompanying text (discussing courts' refusal to
award extracontractual damages).
200. See McRae v. Seafarers' Welfare Plan, 920 F.2d 819, 821 (11th Cir. 1991) (disallowing
emotional distress damages in face of precedent in eleventh and other circuits).
201. See supra notes 99-138 and accompanying text (discussing case law denying relief
properly termed extracontractual).
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damages such as those awarded by the courts in Warren and Vogel should

be unrecoverable as properly defined extracontractual damages.
The availability of extracontractual compensatory or punitive damages

under ERISA could have a significant impact on both the cost and availability of pension plans.an Extracontractual damage awards could undermine
the statute because a principle purpose of the statute is to continue to allow

pension systems to be cost effective. 2°
3 Pension plans are not a mandatory
requirement of employers. 2 4 One reason employee benefit plans covered by
ERISA have been popular to employers is the existence of substantial tax

benefits. 20s These benefits aid both the employees under plans as well as the
employers providing them.? If court costs and damage awards exceed the
benefit that employers receive from the government in the form of favorable
tax treatment, employers, due to the prohibitive costs, may no longer provide
employee benefit plans. 2 The legislative history of ERISA makes clear that
the drafters designed ERISA to provide pension security while not increasing
the costs to employers substantially. 28 Therefore, remedy awards in ERISA
cases should be designed to encourage employers to provide employee benefit

202. See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148 and n. 17 (1985)
(indicating that awards of extracontractual damages could discourage growth of private pension
plans).
203. See House Report, supra note 14 at I reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. AND
ADmIN. NEws at 4639-40 (discussing legislative awareness of possible cost impact of pension
plan legislation); Russell, 473 U.S. at 148 n. 17 (discussing Congressional intent to limit cost
impact due to enactment of ERISA).
204. See CANAN, supra note 27, at 1-15 (stating that while laws may govern present
compensation to employees and established benefit plans, no law requires creation of benefit
plan).
205. See CANAN, supra note 27, at 14 (asserting that tax advantages of qualified retirement
plan make them extremely desireable); see also Vine, Cash or Deferred Arrangements: What's
the Beef? What's at Stake?, 5 VA. TAX Rnv. 855, 856-59 (1986) (discussing favorable treatment
of qualified plans); Graetz, The Troubled Marriage of Retirement Security and Tax Policies,
135 U. PA. L. Ray. 851, 874-94 (1987) (discussing tax policies behind employer-provided
pensions); Note, Employees Not Covered By Qualified Retirement Plans and Those Covered
By Inadequate Plans: The Need For Reform, 20 RuTGERs L. J. 535, 552 (1989) (discussing
favorable tax treatment given to qualified benefit plans). One explanation for the favorable
tax treatment given to qualified benefit plans asserts that there is a national consensus that
the elderly should be supported and social security alone is inadequate to accomplish this
support. Id. at 552.
206. See supra note 205 and accompanying text (discussing tax advantages of qualified
retirement plans).
207. See CANAN, supra note 27, at 90 (stating that major disadvantage of retirement plans
is increased administrative cost due to compliance with the Internal Revenue Service and the
Labor Department).
208. See House Report, supra note 14, at 1 reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. AND
ADmiN. NEWS at 4639 (highlighting congressional concern over danger of increased costs to
employers because of ERISA). The legislative history indicates that the drafters weighed the
improvements sought with ERISA against the increased costs to employers. Id. In fact, the
Committee hired an outside consultant due to concern over the possible increased costs to
employers. Id. at 9 reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. AND ADM1N. NEws at 4646.
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plans rather than discourage employers from providing such plans. 2° 9
Although proponents of extracontractual damage awards under ERISA
section 502(a)(3) do not read ERISA to limit awards of damages, 210 courts
should not read into ERISA provisions for damages that Congress did not
explicitly include. 21' Courts should read ERISA comprehensively, acknowledging that Congress enacted ERISA with references to legal relief removed
from the text. 2 2 Even if courts incorporate trust principles into the statute,
as proponents would argue, extracontractual damages still should not be
available.213 The legislative history and the decision of the Russell Court
should not provide for damage awards which could undermine the availability of pension funds, while offering only a minimal added amount of
security.
CHRISTOPHER F. ROBERTSON

209. See House Report, supra note 14, at 10 reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. AND
NEWS at 4647 (stating that Congress intended to continue to encourage growth of
private employee benefit plans). See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987)
(asserting that public interest requires encouragement of employee benefit plan formation).
The Court in PilotLife, supporting the view that the public interest is served best by encouraging
the formation of employee benefit plans, stated that the detailed provisions of ERISA's
enforcement scheme represent "a careful balancing of the need for prompt and fair claims
settlement procedures against the public interest in encouraging the formation of employee
benefit plans." Id.
210. See supra notes 80-81 and 147-49 and accompanying text (discussing courts' reasoning
that equitable relief language of ERISA does not limit award of monetary damages).
211. See supra note 67-71 and accompanying text (discussing Russell majority's reluctance
to read remedies into ERISA not explicitly included by Congress); see also supra notes 30-47
(discussing comprehensive enforcement provisions of ERISA).
212. See supra note 181 and accompanying text (discussing deletion of legal relief in final
enactment of ERISA).
213. See supra notes 83-96 and accompanying text (illustrating why trust principles do
not effect comprehensive scheme of tRISA).
ADMI.

